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    THE NEWS MEDIA’S INFLUENCE ON CRIMINAL   
JUSTICE POLICY: HOW MARKET-DRIVEN NEWS
PROMOTES PUNITIVENESS
SARA SUN BEALE*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that commercial pressures are determining the
news media’s contemporary treatment of crime and violence, and
that the resulting coverage has played a major role in reshaping
public opinion, and ultimately, criminal justice policy. The news
media are not mirrors, simply reflecting events in society. Rather,
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media content is shaped by economic and marketing considerations
that frequently override traditional journalistic criteria for
newsworthiness. This Article explores local and national television’s
treatment of crime, where the extent and style of news stories about
crime are being adjusted to meet perceived viewer demand and
advertising strategies, which frequently emphasize particular
demographic groups with a taste for violence. Newspapers also
reflect a market-driven reshaping of style and content, resulting in
a continuing emphasis on crime stories as a cost-effective means to
grab readers’ attention. This has all occurred despite more than a
decade of sharply falling crime rates.
The Article also explores the accumulating social science evidence
that the market-driven treatment of crime in the news media has the
potential to skew American public opinion, increasing the support
for various punitive policies such as mandatory minimums, longer
sentences, and treating juveniles as adults. Through agenda setting
and priming, media emphasis increases public concern about crime
and makes it a more important criteria in assessing political
leaders. Then, once the issue has been highlighted, the media’s
emphasis increases support for punitive policies, though the
mechanisms through which this occurs are less well understood.
This Article explores the evidence for the mechanisms of framing,
increasing fear of crime, and instilling and reinforcing racial
stereotypes and linking race to crime. 
Although other factors, including distinctive features of American
culture and the American political system, also play a role, this
Article argues that the news media are having a significant and
little-understood role in increasing support for punitive criminal
justice policies. Because the news media is not the only influence on
public opinion, this Article also considers how the news media
interacts with other factors that shape public opinion regarding the
criminal justice system.
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1. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Univ. of Chi. Press 2001) (emphasizing the distinctive social
organization of late modernity); BRIAN JARVIS, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: PUNISHMENT AND US
CULTURE (2004) (exploring the influence of literature, art, film, and television); MICHAEL
TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004)
(exploring seven other explanations and proposing a complex interaction of policy cycles,
sensibilities, and moral panics); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (emphasizing the role of
historic differences between the United States and Europe regarding class distinctions, which
lead Europeans to reject degradation of prisoners because of commitment to eliminating low
status treatments).
2. Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological
and Other Non-legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 32-44, 51-64 (1997).
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the twentieth century the criminal justice system
in the United States underwent a major change, a shift toward
more punitive policies, that has had a profound impact. Every U.S.
jurisdiction adopted and implemented a wide range of harsher
policies. In the federal system and in every state, sentences for
adult offenders were substantially increased and in many instances
made mandatory. Policies were adopted to make the conditions of
incarceration more onerous for adult offenders, and every state
adopted provisions allowing more juvenile offenders to be prose-
cuted and punished as adults. The result is a system that is
significantly more punitive than that of any other Western democ-
racy, and an incarceration rate that is—by a large margin—the
highest in the world. Throughout this period crime was a highly
salient political issue, and the policies in question had widespread
public support.
Not surprisingly, there is a good deal of scholarship seeking to
explain this fundamental shift in American criminal justice policy.1
There have almost certainly been multiple causes. In prior work I
explored two factors: (1) the role played by partisan politics that
developed when civil rights and the Vietnam war dominated the
political landscape; and (2) the cognitive processes of risk percep-
tion.2 This Article addresses two other issues. The first is a
preliminary question: were the new American policies simply a
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3. I assume, and do not attempt here to prove, that changes in public opinion can bring
about changes in public policy. For a seminal work addressing that issue, see James A.
Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543 (1995). 
response to sharply rising crime rates—and were these harsh
policies responsible for bringing crime rates down? If so, nothing is
left to explain. The first portion of this Article describes the
adoption of the punitive policies and concludes that they cannot be
explained, at least in full, by anything distinctive about the rates or
types of crimes that occur in the United States. The door is thus
open for other explanations.
The second portion of the Article explores the news media’s
treatment of crime during the 1990s and into the new century, the
reasons for that treatment, and the question whether the treatment
of crime—in addition to or instead of the crime itself, or other
factors such as partisan politics—may have had a significant role
in reshaping public opinion, and ultimately criminal justice policy.3
I begin with the question of how the news media treats crime,
focusing on economic factors and changes in media coverage. The
news media are not mirrors, simply reflecting events in society.
Rather, media content is shaped by economic and marketing
considerations that override traditional journalistic criteria for
newsworthiness. This trend is apparent in local and national
television’s treatment of crime, in which the extent and style of
news stories about crime are adjusted to meet perceived viewer
demand and advertising strategies, which frequently emphasize
particular demographic groups with a taste for violence. In the case
of local television news, this trend results in virtually all channels
devoting a disproportionate part of their broadcast to violent
crimes, and to many channels adopting a fast-paced, high-crime
strategy based on an entertainment model. In the case of network
news, this strategy results in much greater coverage of crime,
especially murder, with a heavy emphasis on long-running, tabloid-
style treatment of selected cases in both the evening news and
newsmagazines. Newspapers also reflect a market-driven reshaping
of style and content, accompanied by massive staff cuts, resulting
in a continued emphasis on crime stories as a cost-effective means
to grab readers’ attention. These economic and marketing consider-
ations shape the public’s exposure to crime in the news media.
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4. JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF CYNICISM: THE PRESS
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 30-37 (1997); see also JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: HOW THE
MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 5-6, 9 (Pantheon Books 1996) (describing why
journalists have changed, how they undermine the press’s credibility, and what they are
doing to reform the profession); cf. William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court,
the First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 170 (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions encourage a nonanalytical and/or celebrity-oriented
style of journalism, rather than a public-interest style of journalism involving serious
investigation and reporting of issues of public import).
Turning next to the question of how the news media’s market-
driven treatment of crime may influence public opinion and bolster
support for punitive penal policies, I survey research in the social
sciences and media studies. Two key points emerge from this
survey. First, through agenda setting and priming, the news
media’s relentless emphasis increases public concern about crime
and makes it a more important criteria in assessing political
leaders. Once the issue has been highlighted, the news media’s
emphasis appears to increase support for punitive policies, though
the mechanisms through which this occurs are less understood. I
explore the evidence for several of these mechanisms. One strand
of research focuses on framing, which appears to increase support
for punitive criminal justice policies by enhancing viewers’ accep-
tance of the assumption that crime results from individual choices
rather than societal causes. Other research explores the connection
between news media portrayals of crime and increased fear, which
in turn has links to punitive attitudes. Finally, media appears to
influence public attitudes about criminal justice policies by
instilling and reinforcing racial stereotypes and linking race to
crime. This Article thus builds on the work of media scholars such
as Joseph Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, who have argued
that the news media, traditionally thought to be one of the major
institutions supporting democracy, may actually be undermining or
distorting it.4
My focus here is a narrow one, necessarily leaving out many
related—and potentially very important—facets of the news media’s
impact on criminal justice policy. First, the news media’s treatment
of crime may have other, more salutary effects that are not
addressed here. For example, the media has helped focus attention
on the cases of innocent persons who were wrongly convicted,
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5. The Chicago Tribune is perhaps the leading example. It won the 2003 Pulitzer Prize
for its editorials on the death penalty, and its investigative reporting helped lead to the
exoneration of many individuals on death row and to the governor’s moratorium on
executions. For a collection of the Tribune’s death penalty stories from 1999, see National
Online Youth Summit, Spring 2001: Does Capital Punishment Have a Future?, http://www.
abanet.org/publiced/noys/01/learning/innocence.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). For an
archived collection of the Tribune’s death penalty editorials from 2002, see Chicago Tribune
Death Penalty Editorial, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-dpeditorials
-special,1,4085577.special (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
The Medill Innocence Project at Northwestern University was one of the pioneers in
employing techniques of investigative journalism to develop evidence exonerating persons
serving long criminal sentences for crimes they did not commit, resulting in the exoneration
and release of ten persons, five of whom were on death row. “The project’s work, which has
been featured on ‘60 Minutes,’ ‘48 Hours,’ ‘Dateline NBC,’ and the front pages of the New
York Times and the Washington Post, has been cited for stimulating a national debate on the
death penalty.” Medill Innocence Project, http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/medill/ugrad/
areas_of_study/medill_innocence_project.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
6. For example, the extensive press coverage of California Highway Patrolmen beating
motorist Rodney King, and of the sexual assault on New York prisoner Abner Louima, has
been credited with generating congressional hearings and causing local and federal officials
to examine the New York Police Department’s policies. See Laurie L. Levenson, Police
Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.1, 2 nn.2-3 (2001)
(beginning her analysis with the comment that “[t]he television images [of King and Louima]
are seared in our minds”); Asit S. Panwala, The Failure of Local and Federal Prosecutors To
Curb Police Brutality, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 659 (2003); cf. Frank Rudy Cooper,
Understanding “Depolicing”: Symbiosis Theory and Critical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L.
REV. 355, 361 & n.33 (2002) (noting shift in New York’s media coverage from support for
police department being tough on crime to criticism of department for racism and brutality
in the wake of the Louima case).
7. See, e.g., Carolina D. Watts, Note, “Indifferent [Towards] Indifference:” Post-
DeShaney Accountability for Social Services Agencies when a Child Is Injured or Killed
Under Their Protective Watch, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 126-28 (2002) (describing press coverage
of the death of five-year-old Terrell Peterson and the “increased public outcry over” cases in
which child protective services fail to protect children under their care from abuse).
promoting public support for DNA testing and other mechanisms to
avoid miscarriages of justice.5 The news media has provided
extensive coverage of incidents of police abuse,6 and may have
played a role in promoting legal reforms with respect to other
subjects such as drunk driving and child abuse.7 Second, other
factors may have a greater impact than the news media. My claim
here is not that the news media is the sole or even the most
important cause of America’s uniquely punitive criminal justice
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8. Some of the other factors are addressed by the articles in supra note 1. Other forms
of media, particularly entertainment media, may also have a significant effect. Only a few
studies addressing public opinion regarding criminal justice policies have considered both
entertainment media and news media. For a review of some of the literature on both forms
of media, see R. Lance Holbert et al., Fear, Authority, and Justice: Crime-Related TV Viewing
and Endorsements of Capital Punishment and Gun Ownership, 81 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 343, 344-48 (2004). The article’s authors did a comparative evaluation of three
forms of television viewing: news, crime drama, and police reality. They found that TV news
and police reality programming were consistently and positively related to fear of crime;
news viewing, however, had only half the predictive value of police reality viewing. Id. at 351.
They also found that viewing crime drama and police reality shows had a significant direct
relationship with positive attitudes toward capital punishment, whereas viewing news
programs had a negative relationship in one year studied and no statistical relationship in
the other year. Id. at 351-52. 
9. By its nature, the notion of distortion seems to require a normative baseline against
which present policies and rates of imprisonment can be judged. Although I do not provide
a normative theory, I believe that three key points emerge from the information presented
in this Article that—especially taken together—strongly suggest that we are far from the
policies that would emerge from an undistorted process. First, we have a uniquely high rate
of imprisonment—unique as judged both by comparisons to other nations today, and unique
by historic standards. Moreover, the public support for these policies is based to a significant
degree on a clear factual error. Finally, racial stereotyping and bias appear to have distorted
and influenced both the media’s coverage and its effect on public opinion.
policies,8 but rather that worrisome evidence suggests that it is
playing a significant role in shaping—or distorting—public opinion.9
Parts I and II set the stage by describing the punitive policies of
the last part of the twentieth century and the drop in crime rates.
Part III puts the U.S. developments in a comparative perspective,
concluding that the United States’ uniquely punitive policies cannot
be explained, at least in full, by anything distinctive about the rates
or types of crime that occur in this country. Part IV explores the
link between the news media’s treatment of crime and public
pressure for punitive crime policies. It discusses the survey
research and experimental simulations providing evidence that
news media may significantly increase support for punitive policies.
I do not, however, argue that the news media was the sole, or even
the most important factor in promoting punitiveness. The U.S.
movement toward punitiveness was well underway by the 1990s,
the period of many of the media developments I describe. Part IV
notes other factors that shape public opinion and considers how the
news media interacts with them. 
This Article brings together research from a variety of
fields–including media studies, political science, and criminol-
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10. By 1983, forty-nine of the fifty states had adopted one or more mandatory minimum
sentence provisions. MICHAEL H. TONRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM
IMPACTS 25 (1987).
11. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7-10 (1991) (describing legislation
passed in 1984, and at two-year intervals thereafter).
12. California’s “three-strikes” law became effective March 7, 1994, and was later ratified
by voters in a referendum. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12 (West 1994). The provisions
are called “three-strikes” laws based on a baseball analogy: after three strikes you are
“out”—that is, subject to enhanced penalty, which in California is a mandatory sentence of
life without parole. After California and Washington State adopted their three-strikes laws
in 1993 and 1994, twenty-two other states and the federal government adopted new laws
enhancing punishments for repeat felony offenders. See generally JOHN CLARK ET AL., NAT’L
INST. OF JUSTICE, “THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION (1997);
Michael G. Turner et al., “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Legislation: A National Assessment,
59 FED. PROBATION 16, 17 (1995).
ogy–that has received too little attention from lawyers and legal
academics, in an attempt to shed light on important forces that are
playing a role in shaping criminal justice policy. For readers from
those other fields, the Article connects these bodies of research with
a variety of important changes in the criminal justice system.
     I. THE PUNITIVE POLICIES OF THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
A. Sentences for Adult Criminals, Rates of Imprisonment
The trend toward restructuring the sentencing process and
increasing sentence severity was well underway in the 1980s, and
it continued throughout the 1990s as imprisonment rates swelled
to unprecedented levels. Many U.S. jurisdictions adopted manda-
tory minimum sentencing provisions in the 1980s,10 with a similar
but more comprehensive trend at the federal level involving both
mandatory minimum penalty statutes and more severe and rigid
federal sentencing guidelines.11 In the 1990s, as the new higher
sentences took effect, several states supplemented them with highly
punitive recidivist statutes, many based on California’s “three-
strikes” law.12 Although these statutes vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, the new recidivist statutes provided that the sentence
406 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:397
13. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 12, at 2, 12-13; Turner et al., supra note 12, at 19.
14. Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence Severity:
1980-1998, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 12, 17 (1999).
15. Id.
16. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: GROWTH IN
POPULATION CONTINUES 4 (2006) [hereinafter NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES], available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf. Russia, the former world leader, has reduced
its rate to 564 per 100,000 population; this number is expected to continue to decrease due
to a prisoner amnesty program implemented by Russia’s Parliament in 2000. Id. at 1.
17. See Peter Morrison, States Cut Back on Inmates’ Privileges, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 21, 1995,
at A22.
18. Peter Morrison, The New Chain Gang; States’ New ‘Get-Tough’ Prison Policies Are
Gaining Support from Politicians and the Courts, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at A1 (quoting
Arizona’s Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio). In 2006 Sheriff Arpaio, who continues these
policies, toured Britain and recommended that British prisons adopt his practices. Emily
Smith, Your Jails Are Like a Holiday Camp, SUN (London), July 24, 2006. 
for a third, or in some cases a second, qualifying offense would be
doubled or increased to life without parole.13
By the end of the twentieth century the combined effects of the
sentencing changes brought about significant changes in the periods
of incarceration served by offenders and in the rates of imprison-
ment in the United States. In the federal courts the average
sentence imposed in 1995 was nearly twice that imposed in 1980,14
and federal offenders sentenced in 1998 will spend about twice as
long in prison, on average, as offenders sentenced in 1984.15 By
2004, the rate of imprisonment in the United States was estimated
at 724 per 100,000 population, by far the highest in the world.16
Part III puts the U.S. experience in a comparative perspective.
B. Conditions of Incarceration, Treatment of Offenders
Many jurisdictions have deliberately made the conditions of
imprisonment more harsh. For example, one study in 1995 found
that thirty states had abolished a variety of inmate privileges
during the past year—such as weight lifting, family visits, and
furloughs to attend family funerals—and most other states had
drastically restricted privileges.17 One notoriously tough-on-crime
Arizona sheriff, who said that inmates “‘should be made to suffer,
in a humane sort of way,’” housed inmates in military-surplus tents
set on gravel fields “where temperatures often reach 110 degrees
and can drop below freezing during winter nights.”18
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19. As of 1997, chain gangs had been introduced in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Iowa,
Oklahoma, Nevada, Tennessee, and Wisconsin; legislation proposing chain gang
requirements had been introduced in California, Indiana, Montana, and Tennessee; and
proposals for chain gangs had surfaced in West Virginia, South Carolina, Washington, and
Vermont. Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1459-60 (1997). In 2005 Butler
County, Ohio, instituted chain gangs, but the county’s implementation seemed less harsh
than the programs initiated during the 1990s. See Janice Morse, Even Chain-Gang Laborers
Like the Idea, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 11, 2005, at 2C (noting that prisoners would get
regular breaks and that some preferred being out of doors). “The term ‘chain gang’ was
derived from the fact that prisoners had a heavy steel or iron shackle permanently riveted
to each ankle, with a heavy chain permanently fixed to connect the shackles.” Peloso, supra
at 1465. Instead of heavy, permanent irons, contemporary prisoners on the chain gang wear
removable chains made of lightweight steel and leather cuffs or metal shackles on each leg.
Id. at 1468.
20. For a discussion of the hardships faced by inmates sentenced to chain gangs, see
Peloso, supra note 19, at 1463-67. See generally Emily S. Sanford, Note and Comment, The
Propriety and Constitutionality of Chain Gangs, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (1997).
21. Daniel M. Weintraub, No Chains, No Gain, Says Legislator Who Thinks Prisons Too
Soft, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 14, 1996, at A03 (quoting California State Assemblyman
Brett Granlund).
22. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3, 59
During this period, eight states reintroduced the chain gang—in
which shackled inmates work outside the prisons—and chain gangs
were considered in other states as well.19 Historically, chain gangs
were associated with harsh living conditions, brutality, and high
rates of mortality; public exposés of these conditions led to the
elimination of chain gangs in almost all states in the 1930s and
1940s.20 Contemporary support for the reintroduction of chain
gangs is explicitly punitive. One California legislator’s bill to
authorize chain gangs was intended, in his words, “to punish, not
rehabilitate.”21
C. Treatment of Juvenile Offenders
Beginning in the mid-1990s there was a fundamental shift in
juvenile justice policy in the United States and a major change in
the treatment of serious and violent juvenile offenders. Between
1992 and 1995, forty states adopted or modified laws making it
easier to prosecute juveniles as adults in criminal court, and forty-
seven states and the District of Columbia made changes in their
laws targeting juveniles who commit serious or violent crimes.22 In
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(1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf.
23. Id. at xi.
24. Id. at 6.
25. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97 UPDATE 2 (1998) (noting that twenty-five states made
changes to their statutes permitting transfers of juveniles to adult court in 1996 and 1997).
26. Reformers are introducing research on cognitive development during adolescence to
provide a basis for constitutional limitations through the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, as well as a basis for reevaluating the competency of adolescents to participate in
criminal proceedings. These efforts led to the Supreme Court’s holding in Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005), that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a person who
committed the relevant offense as a juvenile. For a critical discussion of the evidence upon
which the Court relied, see Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v.
Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 380 (2006); see also Symposium, The Mind of a Child:
The Relationship Between Brain Development, Cognitive Functioning, and Accountability
Under the Law, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 317 passim (2006). 
The MacArthur Foundation has developed a research network to design and implement
new research on adolescent development and juvenile justice, and to communicate the
results of these activities to policymakers, practitioners, journalists, and other social
scientists and legal scholars. The network’s activities are described on its website. See
Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, Our Purpose,
http://www.mac-adoldev-juvjustice.org/page2.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
27. See GARLAND, supra note 1, at 90 (reporting “a rapid and sustained increase in
recorded crime rates–not just in the USA and the UK, but in every Western industrialized
nation,” and concluding that “[t]he most likely explanation for a cross-national pattern of
rapid and sustained increase is a social structural one that points to common patterns of
social development”); LEON RADZINOWICZ & JOAN KING, THE GROWTH OF CRIME: THE
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 3-9 (1977); TONRY, supra note 1, at 28-33 (comparing trends in
U.S. crime rates with those from Finland and Germany).
contrast to the traditional regime, which based dispositions on the
juvenile’s needs with the goal of rehabilitation, states have
increasingly shifted to dispositions based on the offense with the
goal of punishment.23 As a result, more juveniles are being charged
and tried in criminal court, detained longer, and incarcerated in
adult correctional institutions than ever before.24 These trends
continued throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium,25
though recent efforts to reverse the tide have emerged.26
II. CRIME RATES
How do crime rates fit into the picture? Like every other
industrialized Western nation, the United States experienced an
increase in crime following World War II.27 But we are no longer in
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28. Gary LaFree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
269, 269 (2000) (reviewing ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN
AMERICA (2000)).
29. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES: LONG TERM TRENDS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/
tables/totalstab.htm (showing yearly homicide rates from 1950-2000); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: VIOLENT
CRIME TRENDS, 1973-2001, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/viortrdtab.
htm (showing yearly robbery rates since 1973).
30. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME
LEVELS DECLINED SINCE 1993, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/cv2.htm.
31. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND VICTIMS
STATISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict.htm.
32. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2004, at 1, 5 (2005),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv04.pdf (noting that from 1993 to 2004 the
overall violent crime rate fell 57%, burglary fell 49%, and motor vehicle theft fell 54%).
33. Id.; see also Jan M. Chaiken, Crunching Numbers: Crime and Incarceration at the
End of the Millennium, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J., Jan. 2000, at 10-12 (discussing the decline
in property crimes). 
34. See generally FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2004, at 72 tbl. 1-1a [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES], available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/documents/CIUS_2004_Section2.pdf. 
a high-crime era. During the last fifteen years the United States
has experienced not only an unprecedented increase in incarcera-
tion rates, but also a remarkable decrease in crime. The 1990s saw
“the largest decline in violent crime rates in more than half a
century.”28 By 2000, homicide and robbery rates were at their
lowest levels in the United States in more than twenty-five years,29
and serious violent crime continued to decline.30 Both victimization
surveys and reported crimes showed steep drops.31 By 2004 the
violent victimization rate reached its lowest level in the thirty-year
history of the National Crime Victimization Survey, a rate less than
half of that in 1993.32 Similarly, property victimization—including
larceny, burglary, and theft in general—declined through 2004,
continuing a twenty-nine year trend.33 Reported crimes showed
similar trends.34
For many people these developments suggest a relatively simple
story: our crime rates increased, harsher penalties were needed and
imposed, and accordingly crime rates fell. Indeed, a widely shared
belief is that our penal policies have been a necessary response to
uniquely high American crime rates. Part III argues that this belief
is simply not accurate. Although the experience of crime certainly
410 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:397
35. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the long term crime trends in the
United States and other nations, see TONRY, supra note 1, at 101-30.
36. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 1, at 7-9; Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population:
Facts, Trends, and Solutions (European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, HEUNI
Paper No. 15, 2001), available at http://www. heuni.fi/uploads/6mq2zlwaaw3ut.pdf (detailing
a growth in the world prison population and discussing the social, economic, and political
implications). Garland argues that over the past twenty years both the United States and the
United Kingdom have seen a similar rise of a “just deserts” penological ideal that focuses on
punishment and has led to harsher policies. GARLAND, supra note 1, at 9. However, Garland
also acknowledges that, though the trends in the United States and the United Kingdom are
similar, “salient” differences exist between the two nations, including a vast disparity in
incarceration rates. See id. at 7, 212 n.5.
37. See NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES, supra note 16, at 1.
played a role in the adoption, implementation, and retention of our
increasingly punitive penal policies, Part III explains why crime
rates cannot provide a sufficient explanation for the unique
developments in the United States. The argument presented here
has been explored in greater detail elsewhere.35 It is presented here,
however, in order to contradict what many regard as conventional
wisdom, and thus clear the way for an analysis of the news media’s
impact.
III. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
How do the developments described in Part I compare to those in
other nations? The American experience is distinctive. Although
other nations have seen increases in punitive policies, the scale of
incarceration, as well as the continued use of capital punishment,
have set the United States far apart from its overseas counterparts.
An examination of international crime developments, furthermore,
shows that crime rates cannot fully account for the differences in
incarceration rates, indicating that other forces must be driving
American punitiveness.
A. Comparing Punitiveness
Although other nations have seen a recent rise in punitive
policies,36 a significant disparity exists between the United States
and other industrialized countries. The Unites States confines a
larger proportion of its population than any other nation.37 The
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38. See id. at 5 (listing the British incarceration rate as 145 per 100,000 population).
39. See Alan Travis, UK Now Europe’s Jail Capital, GUARDIAN, Feb. 27, 2003, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/prisons/story/0,7369,903763,00.html.
40. See NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES, supra note 16, at 5 (listing the Japanese
incarceration rate as 60 per 100,000 population).
41. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES IN
CRIME AND JUSTICE, at viii-x (David P. Farrington et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter CROSS-
NATIONAL STUDIES]. Note, however, that beginning in 1994 the Australian penalties exceeded
those in the United States. Id. at x.
42. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND JUSTICE STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND
AND WALES, 1981-96, 73 app. tbl. 7 (1998) (showing U.S. statistics for 1994 and United
Kingdom statistics for 1995); id. at 77 app. tbl. 11. The study showed that for murder
convictions, 95.8% in the United States and 94.3% in England and Wales were sentenced to
incarceration. Id. at 73 app. tbl. 7.
43. Id. at 73 app. tbl. 7, 77 app. tbl. 11.
44. RICHARD S. FRASE, SENTENCING IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES: COMPARING
ÄPFEL WITH APPLES 18 tbl. 2 (2001) (revealing that 8% of offenders convicted for drug
possession were incarcerated in Germany in 1997, compared to 70% in the United States in
1996). Frase concludes that, in the context of nonviolent offenses, “there is much for
Americans to learn from the German experience with non-custodial sanctions,” namely “how
to deal humanely and efficiently with high-volume, low- and medium-severity crimes.” Id.
at 58.
United States’ incarceration rate, 724 per 100,000 population, is
five times that of England and Wales,38 Europe’s leading jailor,39
and more than twelve times the Japanese rate.40
One important factor that has contributed to this disparity is the
United States’ greater tendency to rely on incarceration in sentenc-
ing for nonviolent offenses. The Bureau of Justice Statistics’s cross-
national study found that the United States and Sweden were more
likely than any other countries to incarcerate burglars, and that the
average sentence for burglars was generally highest in the United
States.41 For example, in the mid-1990s, 59.5% of burglars convicted
in the United States were incarcerated and served an average of
eighteen months.42 In England and Wales, however, a convicted
burglar had a 38.2% chance of being incarcerated, and those
incarcerated could expect to serve 6.5 months.43 Similarly, someone
convicted of drug possession in the mid-1990s was 8.75 times as
likely to be sentenced to imprisonment in the United States than if
convicted in Germany.44 The same pattern applied to offenses
involving the potential for violence. In general, the United States
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45. See CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at xii (reporting that the probability of
custody following a conviction for robbery was highest in the United States and Sweden, and
average time served was highest in the United States and Australia).
46. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1 (2003) (describing the profound changes in policy that have created conflict
between the United States and other developed countries).
47. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). See generally Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
48. See ZIMRING, supra note 46, at 50.
49. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NUMBER OF PERSONS
EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930-2005, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
glance/tables/exetab.htm.
50. ZIMRING, supra note 46, at 16.
51. See id. at 40.
52. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, app. A at 579-80 (2005) (listing the twenty
states).
53. See id. at 576 (citing United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37,
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3); see also ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE
PERSPECTIVE 1 & n.2 (3d ed. 2002) (citing Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights
of Those Facing the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 29/118, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/1984/50/Annex
(May 25, 1984)).
had the highest probability of incarceration and longest average
time served for robbery.45 
The contrast between the United States and other Western
nations in sentencing policy appears particularly sharp in relation
to capital punishment.46 Since Gregg v. Georgia in 1976,47 the
American death penalty has experienced a sort of renaissance,48 and
more than eight hundred people have been executed.49 By contrast,
the last state-sanctioned execution in western Europe occurred in
1977.50 In the intervening years Europeans have developed a
revulsion to the notion of government-sanctioned execution, seeing
the practice as inconsistent with the idea of a civil society.51 Until
2005, when the Supreme Court held that the practice violated the
Eighth Amendment, twenty states permitted the execution of
offenders who were juveniles when they committed their crimes.52
The practice violated the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, which had been ratified by every country in the world
except the United States and Somalia.53
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54. Differences in recording practices and in crime definitions across national boundaries,
as well as differences in enforcement policies and political pressures behind reported crime
statistics, all contribute to this difficulty. PHILLIP L. REICHEL, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 38 (2d ed. 1999). These differences do not mean that nothing can be learned
from a comparative crime analysis, but only that such an analysis must be understood in
light of the inherent problems in making absolute comparisons.
55. This conclusion was also found by Leena Kurki when reviewing the International
Crime and Victimization Survey in 1997. Leena Kurki, International Crime Survey:
American Rates About Average, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Oct. 1997, at 1, 4.
56. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, UNITED NATIONS, SEVENTH UNITED NATIONS SURVEY
OF CRIME TRENDS AND OPERATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, COVERING THE PERIOD
1998-2000, at 10-12 tbl.2.01 [hereinafter 1998-2000 CRIME TRENDS], available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/seventh_survey/7sv.pdf (listing rates of crimes recorded in
police statistics per 100,000 inhabitants for the year 1999: United States, 8517.19; England
and Wales, 10,061.11; Denmark, 9291.31; Finland, 9866.52; Netherlands, 8128.66; Canada,
8117.75; Germany, 7676.39).
57. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, U.S. PRISON POPULATIONS—TRENDS AND
IMPLICATIONS 5 (2004), available at http://sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf.
58. 1998-2000 CRIME TRENDS, supra note 56, at 13-15 tbl.2.02 (listing 1999 rates of
complete homicides, per 100,000 inhabitants: United States, 4.55; England and Wales, 1.45;
Germany, 1.22; Denmark, 0.98; Finland, 2.77; Ireland, 1.01; Spain, 1.16; and the
Netherlands, 1.42); cf. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997) (arguing that the higher American homicide
B. Comparing International Crime Rates
Do crime rates explain or justify the difference in incarceration
rates and overall punitiveness? More crime, or more violent crime,
may account for a higher incarceration rate and justify the use of
harsher penalties. Conversely, a rise in punitiveness may lead to a
drop in crime rates and thus be desirable. Although absolute
comparisons of transnational crime trends are difficult to make,54
a review of international crime rates and developments suggests
that American punitiveness cannot be fully explained or justified by
differences in American crime patterns.
The U.S. crime rate is not particularly high compared with other
industrialized nations that have far lower rates of incarceration.55
As of 1999, England and Wales, Denmark, and Finland all reported
more crime per capita than the United States, and the Netherlands,
Canada, and Germany reported rates not significantly lower than
the United States rate.56 Yet the United States’ incarceration rate
is at least five times that of each of these nations.57
To be sure, the United States does have a significantly higher
homicide rate than its counterparts abroad.58 However, neither
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rate is the result of a significantly higher propensity for a very small portion of American
crimes to result in death).
59. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2001, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/p01.pdf.
60. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2002, at 11 tbl.18 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/p02.pdf (showing that 16,117 out of 142,766 federal prisoners were violent offenders).
61. See NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES, supra note 16, at 5 (showing the United States
incarceration rate as 724 per 100,000).
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., HENRY RUTH & KEVIN R. REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME: RETHINKING OUR
RESPONSE 90 (2003) (noting researchers’ general conclusion that “[c]rime rates can be
brought down with the heavier use of prisons and jails, but the total amount of crime
reduction tends to be disappointingly small, and most of the crimes that are avoided are
property crimes as opposed to the serious violent offenses that everyone wants most to
address”); id. at 98-105 (distinguishing the impact of increased incarceration on different
offenses and concluding that it has been most successful in reducing property crime, least
successful in reducing drug crime, and modestly successful in reducing serious violent
offenses—where “a fair assessment might be a ‘Gentlemen C’” grade); Michael Tonry & David
P. Farrington, Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention, in CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 6 (Michael Tonry ed., 1995) (“There is widespread agreement over time and space
that alterations in sanctioning policies are unlikely substantially to influence crime rates.”);
Walmsley, supra note 36, at 18 (“[R]esearch has shown that to have a significant effect on
crime levels you would have to lock up far more people and for longer periods—at greater
homicide alone nor violent crime in general can fully account for the
higher U.S. incarceration rate. According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, in 2001 violent offenders accounted for 49% of state
inmates59 and about 11.3% of federal inmates.60 If we make the
generous assumption that half of all people incarcerated in the
United States were violent offenders, the U.S. nonviolent incarcera-
tion rate would be at least 362 per 100,000 population,61 as
compared to the total British incarceration rate of 145 per 100,000
population.62 Because the British have the highest rate of incarcera-
tion among industrialized nations other than the United States, we
clearly incarcerate many more nonviolent offenders than other
nations, and our incarceration rates are not simply the result of our
having more crime, or more violent crime, than other nations.
What about the argument that our high rates of incarceration
were the cause of the sharp declines in crime that the United States
experienced during the 1990s? Most scholars agree that altering
sentencing policy in the United States, and elsewhere, has a
relatively small influence on criminal activity,63 and that social
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public expense—than even the countries who are most enthusiastic about imprisonment
have been willing to do.”); see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME:
A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 4-8 (2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
incarceration-crime.pdf (noting that economic growth, changes in drug markets, strategic
policing, and community responses to crime all contributed to the decline in crime during the
1990s, and that other factors such as diminishing returns and the continued demand for
drugs place significant limits on the degree to which incarceration can reduce crime rates);
Ayse Đmrohoroğlu et al., What Accounts for the Decline in Crime?, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 707
(2004) (employing a dynamic economic model and finding the two most important
determinants of crime from 1980 to 1996, in order of importance, were a higher probability
of apprehension, stronger economy, and aging of the population; that the effect of
unemployment was negligible; and that increased income inequality prevented a larger
decline); Joachim J. Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment, 99 AM.
J. SOC. 911, 916-19 (1994) (analyzing crime rates and imprisonment rates in the United
States and Germany, and concluding that “crime and criminal punishment seem to develop
causally independently of each other in each country”). 
One recent study did find a substantial deterrent effect from three-strikes legislation. See
Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two-
and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (2002) (applying county-by-county data
to an economic model finding a greater deterrent effect from California’s three-strikes
legislation). Shepherd claims that during the first two years, the legislation deterred
“approximately eight murders, 3952 aggravated assaults, 10,672 robberies, and 384,488
burglaries.” Id. at 159. Shepherd’s study presents several potential problems. First,
econometric models may be inadequate to approximate the behavior of real individuals. For
instance, Shepherd’s model posits that individuals make decisions to commit crimes on a
utility-maximization basis. Even if this point is valid, it may not capture crimes committed
in the “spur of the moment” or “crimes of passion” that work counter to an individual’s good
reason. Furthermore, Shepherd has no estimate for nonquantifiable factors—for example,
those not related to income and loss—and the potential error is great. Second, the estimated
deterrence in her model does not comport with reality. Her results showed a deterrence of
384,488 burglaries from 1994 to 1996. Id. However, a review of data from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics shows that reported burglaries decreased from a level of 384,257 in 1994
to 312,212 in 1996. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORTED CRIME
IN CALIFORNIA, available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/
StatebyState.cfm (search “California” data in the “Number of property crimes” variable
group) (last visited Oct. 4, 2006). One reason why Shepherd’s model predicted such a high
deterrence for robberies may have been the strong influence of income and monetary loss
variables on her model.
64. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 100-27 (1995) (concluding that increases in
incarceration in California during the 1980s may have resulted in some reduction in burglary
and larceny, but finding no substantial incapacitation benefits for homicide, assault, and
robbery); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 85-105 (2001) (concluding that California’s three-strikes law
reduced crime in California by only 0.6%); William Spelman, The Limited Importance of
Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 97, 123-25 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel
Wallman eds., rev. ed. 2006) (attributing approximately 27% of the drop in crime rates to
forces operating independently of punitive legislation account for
most of the change in crime rates.64 Comparative analysis “shows
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prison expansion and the remainder of the drop to other social factors). For a challenge to
the analysis of Zimring and his colleagues and their response, compare Brian P. Janiskee &
Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of the Case Against
California’s Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43 (2000), with Franklin E. Zimring & Sam
Kamin, Facts, Fallacies, and California’s Three Strikes, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (2002).
Other scholarship gives increased incarceration much greater weight. Steven Levitt
characterizes prior studies as providing “very strong” evidence linking increased punishment
to lower crime rates, with estimates of elasticities of crime with respect to expected
punishment ranging from –.10 to –.40; using an estimate for elasticity, he concludes that the
increase in incarceration during the 1990s can account for a reduction in crime of 12% for
homicide and violent crime and 8% for property crime. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why
Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 163, 178-79 (2004). Levitt’s article has several limitations that should be noted.
Extrapolating from prior correlation studies, it posits an estimate for elasticity and argues
on that basis that increased imprisonment is one of four factors that can provide a convincing
explanation for the observed decrease in crime during the 1990s. Id. at 179 & n.7. He notes,
however, that application of the same factors does not explain the rise in crime during the
preceding period of 1973 to 1991. Id. at 185-86. Moreover, his analysis is not comparative;
his only reference to comparative data—in a footnote—lumps together all European nations.
Id. at 183 n.10. He also acknowledges that at the margin, increased spending for police would
have a greater impact on crime reduction. Id. at 179.
The argument is over degree. Although Levitt argues that incarceration has a significant
effect through incapacitation and deterrence, he recognizes that other factors can cancel out
this effect. Moreover, he concedes that the massive increases in incarceration from 1973 to
1991 did not have the effect of decreasing crime that his model predicts. Id. at 184-86.
Apparently other factors were more important during this period. Scholars such as Frank
Zimring, whose work emphasizes the limited effect of increased incarceration, do agree that
increased incarceration rates play some role in crime reduction. See, e.g., ZIMRING ET AL.,
supra, at 85 (noting the level of reduction for felonies is between 0 and 2%). Indeed, it would
be fatuous to suggest that incarceration could not affect crime rates: Incarcerating all males
during the crime prone ages from fifteen to thirty-five would certainly reduce crime. But it
would do so by a mechanism that would incarcerate many men who would never have
committed an offense, and certainly would be an enormously costly policy in both social and
economic terms.
65. TONRY, supra note 1, at 98.
66. Id. at 101-04.
that gross crime trends are determined by fundamental social and
structural forces that affect most Western countries, and that they
follow much the same broad patterns irrespective of national
differences in crime control policies and punishment practices.”65
For example, historic crime trends in England, Scandinavia,
Germany, Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium have been broadly
consistent despite differences in national policy.66 Recent compara-
tive data also support the view that imprisonment rates do not
determine crime rates. For example, a 2002 report by the Research,
Development, and Statistics Directorate of the United Kingdom
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67. GORDON BARCLAY & CYNTHIA TAVARES, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/
hosb502.pdf.
68. The selected nations were Ireland, Italy, England and Wales, Scotland, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, and
Belgium. Id.
69. Compare id. (showing changes in crime rates from 1996 to 2000: Sweden, +3%;
France, +6%; Germany, -6%; the Netherlands, +9%; Italy, -9%; Spain, -1%; and England and
Wales, -8%), with THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 57, at 5 (showing 2003 incarceration
rates per 100,000 population: Sweden, 73; France, 85; Germany, 91; Netherlands, 93; Italy,
100; Spain, 125; and England and Wales, 139).
70. Walmsley, supra note 36, at 16; see TONRY, supra note 1, at 27-34.
Home Office compared crime experiences across Europe.67 Among
fifteen selected European Union nations, eight saw crime rates
increase and seven saw rates decrease between 1996 and 2000, with
changes in crime rates ranging from a 27% drop in Ireland to a 17%
increase in Belgium.68 These nations’ relative incarceration rates,
however, do not correlate with their respective changes in crime
rate, suggesting that the two statistics may not be causally
related.69 Although a full analysis of the relationship between crime
rates and incarceration is beyond the scope of this Article, this brief
survey gives a sense of the data supporting the widely shared
scholarly view “that crime rates alone cannot explain ... prison
populations.”70
C. The Comparative Bottom Line
Despite popular belief to the contrary, the United States did not
have a uniquely bad crime problem that by itself could account for
the adoption of our uniquely punitive penal policies. Moreover, we
have maintained these policies despite the fact that we now have
crime rates that are low by both historic and comparative stan-
dards. Assuming that crime rates played some role in bringing
about harsher policies and then in reducing crime, the puzzle is the
degree to which the United States diverged from its Western
counterparts. What then accounts for America’s uniquely punitive
policies? The remainder of this Article examines the role played by
the American news media in shaping public opinion and criminal
justice policy.
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71. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 106 tbl.2.1 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 SOURCEBOOK], available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t21.pdf. 
72. The Gallup Organization, Crime Tops List of Americans’ Local Concerns, June 21,
2000, available at http://wwwgalluppoll.comcontent/?ci=2800&pg=1. But note that Gallup’s
definition of crime in this survey includes other issues like gun control. Id.
73. 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 106 tbl.2.1 (indicating that fear of
war/international tensions, terrorism, and the economy were the leading concerns from 2002
to 2004). 
         IV. PUBLIC OPINION, PUNITIVENESS, POLITICS, AND THE           
NEWS MEDIA
Surprisingly, the good news of falling crime rates seems to have
had little effect on public opinion in the United States. Public
opinion polls in the United States throughout the 1990s and into
the current decade demonstrated high levels of anxiety about crime,
a persistent unawareness of the drop in crime rates, and strong
support for more punitive measures. National polls identified crime
as the most important problem facing the nation each year from
1994 to 1998, and in 1999 and 2000 crime was selected as the
second- or third-most important national problem.71 In one 2000
survey, crime issues topped Americans’ list of the worst problems
facing their local communities.72 Only the attacks of September 11,
2001, and related concerns about war, terrorism, and the economy,
finally pushed crime out if its lead position in 2002.73 
Moreover, national polling indicates that a majority of the public
is not aware that crime has decreased dramatically. Although there
was a slight dip in 2000 and 2001, the table below reveals the
persistence of a widespread belief that crime in the United States
has been rising rather than falling. 
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74. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, available at http://www.albany.
edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2332005.pdf (footnotes omitted) (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
Table 2.33.200574
Attitudes toward level of crime in the United States 
United States, selected years 1989-2005
Question: “Is there more crime in the U.S. than there
was a year ago, or less?”
More
Crime
Less
Crime
Same
Amount
of Crime
Don’t
Know/
Refused
1989 84% 5% 5% 6%
1990 84 3 7 6
1992 89 3 4 4
1993 87 4 5 4
1996 71 15 8 6
1997 64 25 6 5
1998 52 35 8 5
2000 47 41 7 5
2001 41 43 10 6
2002 62 21 11 6
2003 60 25 11 4
2004 53 28 14 5
2005 67 21 9 3
Perhaps this result should not be surprising. Numerous studies
have indicated that only a small fraction of the U.S. public is
knowledgeable about public affairs, and this state of political
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75. See generally Michael Schudson, America’s Ignorant Voters, WILSON Q., Spring 2000,
at 16 (discussing the “appalling political ignorance of the American electorate”).
76. See 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 140-41 tbl.2.47, available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t247.pdf (reporting for 1985 to 2002).
77. See id.; Hofer & Semisch, supra note 14, at 12 (reporting data from multiple sources
dating back to 1980). From 1980 to 1995 the percentage responding “[n]ot harshly enough”
remained between 80% and 86% every year but 1987, when it slipped to 79%. However, the
rate responding “[n]ot harshly enough” fell to 78% in 1996, 74% in 1998, 68% in 2000, and
67% in 2002. 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 140-41 tbl.2.47, available at http://www.
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t247.pdf.
78. 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 141 tbl.2.47, available at http://www.albany.
edu/sourcebook/pdf/t247.pdf.
79. Crime rates did rise in the early 1990s, and measures such as three-strikes
legislation and chain gangs that were adopted in the early to mid 1990s may be seen as a
response to increased crime rates or individual crimes that received extensive publicity, such
as the murder and kidnapping of schoolgirl Polly Klaas. See Beale, supra note 2, at 57-59.
ignorance has changed little since social scientists began to
measure it in the 1940s.75
Public opinion also provides strong support for more punitive
policies. For twenty years a random nationwide public opinion poll
has asked, “In general, do you think the courts in [your] area deal
too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?”76 In every year
from 1980 to 1998, more than 74% of those polled have responded
“[n]ot harshly enough.”77 Although the percent of respondents who
say sentences are not harsh enough fell to 67% in 2002,78 that is
still a very high level of agreement.
The general consensus that sentences are not harsh enough has
persisted despite the major increases in both sentence length
discussed above, as well as the record-high rates of incarceration.
What explains the persistence of public anxiety and support for
punitiveness in light of current conditions in the United States?
Although public opinion likely will lag behind events, and thus
concern about crime might persist for some time after crime rates
have fallen,79 other factors likely are enhancing public concern, and
punitive attitudes, about crime. This Article seeks to explore the
role played by the media in shaping public opinion about crime and
criminal justice. In so doing, I do not mean to suggest that the news
media are the only or even most important factor. The story of
cause and effect is much more complex. Some of the changes in
media noted below occurred after the punitiveness movement was
well underway.
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80. JAMES T. HAMILTON, CHANNELING VIOLENCE: THE ECONOMIC MARKET FOR VIOLENT
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING 157-58, 197-99 (1998). Hamilton demonstrated that the levels of
violence in entertainment programming are determined by marketing factors such as the
size and demographic composition of the potential viewing audience, the distribution of
tastes for violent programming, and the priority advertisers place on different groups. Id. at
51-54. In particular, the age and gender of potential viewers are key determinants of the
prevalence of violence. Id. at 52. Advertisers of many products place a high value on the
younger viewers (age 18-34) who have the greatest taste for violence, because those younger
viewers have not yet solidified their purchasing habits and are perceived as more easily
influenced by advertising than older viewers. Id. at 53.
81. See id. at 134-38. Hamilton documented the networks’ manipulation of violence in
order to establish specific brand identities with certain demographic groups. For example,
primetime movies shown on FOX have far greater use of sex and violence than the other
major networks (ABC, NBC, CBS), which is consistent with FOX’s reputation among critics,
viewers, advertisers, and government officials for using higher levels of objectionable content.
Id. at 134-35. Among cable channels, those that promote a family- or women-friendly image
(for example, Disney, Lifetime, and AMC) steer clear of violence, whereas others like WGN,
TBS, and SciFi show considerable levels of violence. Id. at 136. Premium cable channels,
such as HBO and Showtime, show unedited theatrical films, which means that they can have
higher levels of controversial content than broadcast television. Id. at 138. However, brand
differentiation is still evident among premium channels. Id. Encore has a much lower rate
of controversial content consistent with its attempt to develop a reputation for high-quality,
low-violence programming. Id.
82. See id. at 142-43. Ratings during the so-called “sweeps” months of February, May,
July, and November are the basis for setting local advertising rates. Id. In order to aid their
local stations, the broadcast networks devote significant energy and resources to special
programming to attract high ratings. Id. at 143. Hamilton studied programming during these
periods and found that networks purposely decreased or increased violence and sexual
content according to their strategy for attracting ratings among specific demographic groups.
Id. at 143-49. For example, FOX deliberately increased its percentage of violent films in
keeping with its target viewers, and CBS, with allegiance to older viewers, decreased its use
of violent films. Id. at 144-45.
83. Id. at 148. For example, in order to compete and attract young males whom they
A. How the Media Portray Crime and the Criminal Justice
System
Television networks and stations sell audiences to advertisers by
offering programs to viewers. James Hamilton’s groundbreaking
study demonstrated that broadcasters adjust the level of violence
in entertainment programming on television to the target audiences
they seek to attract and the products to be advertised.80 They
manipulate violence in entertainment programming to establish
specific brand identities,81 increase viewership during periods
when local advertising rates are set,82 and counter especially
popular programming on competitors’ channels.83 In the context of
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hoped were not wedded to the popular comedy Seinfeld, HBO deliberately programmed
“Testosterone Thursday” as a violent viewing alternative. Id. at 151 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In response to Monday Night Football, some channels explicitly focused on
nonviolent programs to attract women, whereas others turned up the volume on violence in
order to attract those males for whom football aggression insufficiently met their taste for
violence. Id. at 148-49.
84. Sensationalized journalism is not, of course, entirely new. See, e.g., Jane W.
Gibson-Carpenter & James E. Carpenter, Race, Poverty, and Justice: Looking Where the
Streetlight Shines, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 105-06 (1994) (describing early use of crime
reporting by newspapers and television, and suggesting that news stories are “real-fictions,”
which incorporate “non-news entertainment elements including adventure, mystery,
romance, pathos and nightmare”); Jessica E. Jackson, Sensationalism in the Newsroom: Its
Yellow Beginnings, the Nineteenth Century Legal Transformation, and the Current Seizure
of the American Press, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL.789, 790-92 (2005) (describing
origins of sensationalist yellow journalism during a period of turmoil in the newspaper
business when large corporations–particularly the rival Hearst and Pulitzer organizations–
competed for readers by highly sensationalized coverage, including exaggerated headlines,
fabricated stories, and coverage that propelled the United States into the Spanish-American
War).
In his 1931 autobiography, Lincoln Steffens described typical “crime waves” that wash over
cities and nearly drown the public and the authorities who feel they must explain and cure
these extraordinary outbreaks of lawlessness with “more law, more arrests, swifter trials,
and harsher penalties.” THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEFFENS 285 (1931). What
accounts for the periodic appearances? Steffens’s account attributes them to the press and
politicians, not to any change in criminal activity. He commented: “I enjoy crime waves. I
made one once; Jacob Riis [a reporter for a rival paper] helped; many reporters joined in the
uplift of the rising tide of crime ....” Id. See generally id. at 285-91 (describing news stories
creating a perception that a wave of burglaries was occurring, though there was no increase
in reported cases).
entertainment programming, use of violence is an economic
strategy to develop specific types of audiences.
The same economic factors increasingly are determining the style
and content of news programming on local and national television,
as well as in the print media. As a result, the coverage of crime
—particularly violent crime—has increased dramatically, and the
nature of the coverage has shifted toward a tabloid style. Similar
trends can be noted in network news, local television news, and
newspapers.84
1. Network News
Despite the falling crime rates, the networks dramatically
increased the coverage of crime in their dinner-hour newscasts in
the 1990s. In 1990 and 1991, the three major networks aired an
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85. See Center for Media and Public Affairs, CMPA Factoids: Crime Coverage in TV
News Data, http://web.archive.org/web/20010111075900/http://www.cmpa.com/factoid/crime.
htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
86. See id.
87. Paul Farhi, Nightly News Blues, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June 2001, at 32, 34-36,
available at http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=41.
88. Id. For a graphic representation of the number of murder stories compared to the
murder rate during the 1990s, see Center for Media and Public Affairs, supra note 85.
89. RICHARD L. FOX & ROBERT W. VAN SICKEL, TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AN
AGE OF MEDIA FRENZY 73-76 (2001).
90. Id. at 74 tbl.2.7.
average of 557 crime stories per year in their evening newscasts.
For the remainder of the decade, they aired an average of 1,613
stories per year.85 In 1995, the peak year, the networks presented
2,574 crime stories in their dinner-hour broadcasts.86 Indeed, crime
was the leading topic the networks covered in their evening news
shows in the 1990s.87 Some of the increase was driven by the
extraordinary coverage given to the O.J. Simpson story, but a much
more general trend was at work. Excluding the Simpson case, the
focus on murder increased steadily throughout the decade, even as
the murder rate declined precipitously. In the first third of the
decade (1990 to 1992), the networks’ evening news averaged fewer
than 100 murder stories each year. During the middle period (1993
to 1996), the networks broadcasted an average of 352 murder
stories per year. In the last third of the decade (1997 to 1999) they
broadcasted an average of 511 murder stories per year—five times
as many as at the beginning of the decade, when the murder rate
was highest.88
During the 1990s the three networks’ coverage of criminal
investigations and trials, such as those of O.J. Simpson, the
Menendez brothers, and JonBenet Ramsey, frequently overshad-
owed hard news on meaningful political and social issues,89 and this
trend has continued. A snapshot analysis of the programming
schedules of three nightly newscasts when a tabloid case was
covered revealed that CBS spent 46% of its broadcast on the tabloid
crime, and NBC and ABC spent 45% and 31%, respectively.90 In a
more extensive study of all the news segments on the three
networks in 1997, tabloid crime stories received more attention
than public policy topics. For example, there were eighty-six news
segments on the JonBenet Ramsey murder investigation, compared
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91. Id. at 76 tbl.2.8.
92. Id.
93. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE WAR ON TERRORISM: THE NOT-SO-NEW
TELEVISION NEWS LANDSCAPE 2 (2002).
94. See id.
95. See 2003 Year in Review, 18 MEDIA MONITOR 1, 2 (2004), available at
http://www.cmpa.com/mediaMonitor/documents/janfeb04.pdf (1002 crime stories); 2002 Year
in Review, 17 MEDIA MONITOR 1, 2 (2003), available at http://www.cmpa. com/mediaMonitor/
documentsjanfeb03.pdf (1318 crime stories); 2001 Year in Review, 16 MEDIA MONITOR 1, 2-3
(2002), available at http://www.cmpa.com/mediaMonitor/documents/ janfeb02.pdf (1244 crime
stories); 2000 Year in Review, 15 MEDIA MONITOR 1, 2 (2001), available at http://www.cmpa.
com/mediaMonitor/documents/janfeb01.pdf (986 crime stories). 
96. See 2004 Year in Review, 19 MEDIA MONITOR 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.
cmpa.com/mediaMonitor/documents/janfeb05.pdf (691 crime stories).
97. See Farhi, supra note 87, at 35.
98. Marc Gunther, The Transformation of Network News: How Profitability Has Moved
Networks Out of Hard News, NIEMAN REPORTS, Summer 1999 Special Issue, at 21, available
to nineteen segments on campaign finance reform and thirty-five
segments on health care.91 Medicare received the highest amount
of coverage among public policy topics at fifty-eight segments,
compared to ninety segments on the O.J. Simpson trial.92 Not even
the events of September 11, 2001 changed the crime-laden news
landscape. Although crime coverage dropped from 11.7% of total
stories in June 2001 to 3.5% in October 2001, it was back at its pre-
September 11 level by 2002.93 In fact, crime was the only “soft
news” topic other than religion that regained the same level of
prominence in network news that it had before the terrorist
attacks.94 Between 2000 and 2003, crime remained the second or
third most frequent topic on the network news, with an average of
1,137 crime stories per year.95 There was, however, a significant
reduction in crime stories in 2004, when crime news fell to fifth
place, trailing the war in Iraq, the presidential election, the
economy, and terrorism.96
What explains the growth and prevalence of crime stories in the
network news, particularly when crime rates were falling?97 The
answer is that the economic pressures facing the networks changed,
and a drive for profits in this new environment pushed the net-
works away from hard news and toward a greater emphasis on
tabloid-style crime stories. Twenty years ago, network news was not
expected to make money; in 1986, NBC News was losing “as much
as $100 million a year.”98 At that time, the big three networks
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at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/99-SpNRspecial99/NRspecial99.pdf.
99. Id. at 20. For a discussion of the culture of the network news divisions during the
1960s and 1970s, and the changes that occurred because of deregulation, changes in
ownership, and increased competition, see JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO
SELL: HOW THE MARKET TRANSFORMS INFORMATION INTO NEWS 160-89 (2004).
100. For a discussion of the change in the FCC’s role, see STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 139-55 (2001).
101. All three networks changed hands in the 1980s. General Electric bought NBC,
Capital Cities Communications bought ABC, and Laurence Tisch, a hotel and theater
magnate, took over CBS. Gunther, supra note 98, at 21. In 1996, Disney acquired ABC; in
2000 Viacom acquired CBS. HAMILTON, supra note 99, at 162. In 2006, however, investor
Sumner Redstone responded to Viacom’s falling stock price by engineering a division of
Viacom and CBS into separate entities. See Viacom Completes Split into 2 Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at C2 (stating that split brought about by Redstone had been completed);
Geraldine Fabrikant, Viacom Comes to the Great Divide, and Calls It a Path to Growth, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at C1 (describing Redstone’s role in bringing about the split and his
emphasis on the stock’s price). The separation into two corporate entities has not lessened
the influential Redstone’s emphasis on CBS’s stock price and profitability, and the network’s
strategy has included a strong emphasis on increasing its ratings by moves such as the
designation of Katie Couric as the anchor for the evening news. See Geraldine Fabrikant &
Bill Carter, A Tortoise Savors the Lead; But the Race Isn’t Over at CBS, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2006, at C1 (noting that Redstone was pleased with performance of CBS’s new chief
executive, whose early moves increased the network’s stock price and earnings, and unhappy
with the performance of Viacom, whose CEO he had already fired).
102. The percent of people who said they regularly watched a nightly network news
broadcast reportedly fell from 60% in 1994 to 30% in 2000. Farhi, supra note 87, at 34.
However, Nielson found only a 10% drop (from 59% to 49%) in the percentage of households
that reported viewing a network news broadcast on any given evening between 1990 and
1998. FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 89, at 61 tbl.2.1.
103. Whereas two-thirds of those over the age of fifty said they watched television news
the previous day, only 44% of those under thirty did so. Farhi, supra note 87, at 34. For a
earned enough money from entertainment programming to carry
their news operations, and they provided hard news for their own
prestige, their self-perceived journalistic responsibility to provide
information that would promote an educated citizenry, and the
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) public service
requirement.99 The environment today is quite different. The FCC
no longer polices the public service requirements,100 and networks
are now owned by corporate conglomerates less likely to tolerate
losses or place a great deal of value on traditional journalistic
criteria of newsworthiness. For example, ABC is now owned by
Disney, and NBC by General Electric.101 Equally important, the
network nightly news programs lost up to one-half of their audience
during the 1990s,102 and the remaining viewers were generally older
and hence less valued by many advertisers.103 During this period
426 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:397
discussion of advertisers’ preferences for younger viewers, see HAMILTON, supra note 80, at
52-53.
104. See Farhi, supra note 87, at 34 (noting that many younger viewers are still working
or commuting when the networks broadcast their nightly news at 6:30 or 7:00 p.m.).
105. James McCartney, News Lite, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June 1997, at 20.
106. Gunther, supra note 98, at 21.
107. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, CHANGING DEFINITIONS OF NEWS 1 (1998),
http://www.journalism.org/node/442.
108. HAMILTON, supra note 80, at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. McCartney, supra note 105, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110.  PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, supra note 107, at 5-6. The authors note
that the 17.1% in 1987 was due to a spike in scandal coverage during the Iran-Contra affair.
Id.
111. Id. at 6. These stories were 6.6% of the total in 1987. Id.
112. Id. Coverage of straight news was 51.4%, 32.9%, and 34.3% in 1977, 1987, and 1997,
respectively. Id.
the networks had to compete with a multiplicity of new competitors,
including all-news networks and the Internet, while also accommo-
dating lifestyle changes that interfere with regular viewing habits
at the dinner hour.104
As the networks’ profit margins eroded, corporate owners
pressured their news divisions to become more efficient. The
networks have acknowledged “that competition from increasing
media rivals—cable news, Fox, and now the Internet—are forcing
them to find new formulas to attract and keep viewers.”105 A
strategy emerged for making network news into a profitable
business: (1) make the product more entertaining; (2) generate
more news programming; and (3) cut the cost of hard news.106
The networks cut back on gathering information on various
forms of hard news—most notably eliminating their foreign news
bureaus—while increasing their focus on what has been called
“infotainment,”107 “soft news,”108 and “news lite.”109 The Project for
Excellence in Journalism compared network news coverage in 1977,
1987, and 1997. It found a dramatic increase in scandal stories,
from less than 0.05% in 1977 to 17.1% in 1987 and 15% in 1997.110
Similarly, human-interest stories and quality-of-life stories (or
“news-you-can-use”) doubled from 8% in 1977 to 16% in 1997.111 By
contrast, straight news or in-depth analysis fell from seven in ten
stories in 1977 to four in ten in 1997.112
Sensational crime stories also fit this strategy. Focusing on the
investigation and trial of a single criminal case gives the networks
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113. See FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 89, at 67-76.
114. Id. at 77 & tbl.2.9 (calculating that the number of editions of these programs
increased from four per week in 1993 to eleven per week in 1999).
115. Id. at 79 & tbl.2.10 (showing that more than 40% of 48 Hours broadcasts included
crime segments in 1997 and 1998, and that 29% to 45% of Dateline broadcasts between 1994
and 1998 included a crime segment).
the opportunity to provide prolonged, detailed, and relatively
inexpensive coverage. As cases drag on for weeks, months, or even
years, they become national melodramas, and the networks and
other media try to develop suspense and interest in cases such as
O.J. Simpson, the Menendez brothers, JonBenet Ramsey, and
Louise Woodward (the British nanny tried for murder of the child
for whom she cared). Some cases, such as O.J. Simpson and William
Kennedy Smith, involve wealthy or famous defendants. Others,
such as the Lorena Bobbitt mutilation case, involve sexual titilla-
tion. Although a few cases, such as those involving Timothy
McVeigh and the officers who beat motorist Rodney King, seem to
involve broader public policy issues, the majority of cases covered
in great detail by the networks had little traditional news value,
and they exemplify the shift in content away from hard news. In
fact, the networks have come increasingly to cover human-interest
trials that would formerly have been left to the tabloid press.113
Another key development altering network news programming
has been the development of the television newsmagazines Dateline
NBC, 20/20, 48 Hours, and 60 Minutes, which have proliferated
since 1993.114 These shows, which air on the networks during
primetime, present true crime stories as dramatic entertainment.
The percent of broadcasts of these shows that included a crime
story varied from roughly 20% on some shows to more than 40% for
others.115 The existence and prominence of these newsmagazines
have played a significant role in moving network news away from
hard news and toward a focus on news as entertainment. The twin
forces of cost-cutting and news as entertainment are exemplified
in the growth of the primetime newsmagazines. New corporate
news executives decided to increase profits by generating addi-
tional programming from the nightly news operations’ fixed costs.
The staff used for the regular news can do double duty for the
newsmagazines, and even some of the star anchors appear on both
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116. Id. at 77 (explaining that former news anchor Dan Rather has hosted CBS’s 48 Hours
and news anchor Tom Brokaw is a frequent contributor to NBC’s Dateline).
117. Gunther, supra note 98, at 24-25.
118. Howard Kurtz, At Newsmags, Aiming Straight for the Eyes, WASH. POST, July 31,
2006, at C01 (describing “blood-and-guts” stories on Dateline and noting the producer of 48
Hours says a Darwinian response led the show to cover murder “almost exclusively for the
past two years”). One analyst noted that journalists are cheaper than actors, but real people
are even cheaper than journalists. Id.
119. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, STRIKING THE BALANCE, AUDIENCE
INTERESTS, BUSINESS PRESSURES AND JOURNALISTS’ VALUES § V (1999), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=67.
120. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, CHANGING DEFINITIONS OF NEWS (1997),
http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/definitions/primetime.asp (last visited
Mar. 10, 2005). 
121. Id.
network news and the newsmagazines.116 News footage can be
recycled between the two, and the network news can provide free
advertising for a newsmagazine. Because newsmagazine producers
choose the stories that they want to cover, rather than the stories
driving the coverage, costs become easier to control. In 1999
production of an original hour of a newsmagazine cost between
$500,000 and $700,000, compared to that of an hour of original
entertainment program, which cost at least $1.2 million and as
much as $13 million an hour for popular programs like ER.117 With
cost comparisons like these, the economics of primetime news-
magazines were very attractive in the 1990s. In the past few years,
however, newsmagazines have suffered from “overexposure” and
competition with even cheaper reality TV programming, leading to
the elimination of some shows and the evolution of others to focus
almost exclusively on murder and other “blood and guts” stories.118
Although the American public thinks of primetime television
newsmagazines as news—81% say 60 Minutes is news and 71% say
Dateline NBC is news—the shows’ producers see these programs as
entertainment.119 Entertainment increasingly means crime and
justice. In the fall of 1997, 60 Minutes covered no stories about
government or foreign affairs, but allocated 27.8% of its show to
segments on crime and law/justice.120 Government issues hardly
fared better on Dateline NBC with only 1.4% of the stories, and
with no stories on foreign affairs and 26% dedicated to crime and
law/justice.121 A 1998 study examined the percent of news magazine
broadcasts that contained a tabloid-style crime story and found it
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122. FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 89, at 79 tbl.2.10 (showing that more than 40% of 48
Hours broadcasts included crime segments in 1997 and 1998, and that 29% to 45% of
Dateline broadcasts between 1994 and 1998 included a crime segment).
123. Id. at 78.
124. See id. at 77 (explaining that these shows often portray crimes as mysteries that are
not solved until the program’s end).
125. Id. at 78.
126. See id. at 62.
127. Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death
Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 586, 588 (2004).
128. Id. at 586-88; see also FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 89, at 98-99 (commenting that
ranged from a low of 19% of programs on 20/20 to 47% of the
airings of 48 Hours.122
The coverage of crime on television newsmagazines is the epitome
of “commodification—‘the packaging and marketing of crime
information for popular consumption.’”123 The show format presents
crime as an unfolding mystery story, beginning with the main
players’ character profiles, then the crime itself (typically murder),
the investigation, and finally the trial.124 These true crime stories
are presented as dramatic entertainment, and rarely is there
in-depth analysis of the legal, criminal justice, or societal issues
that are implicated.125 The crime drama’s unfolding nature is
economically attractive to the shows’ producers in two ways. First,
it is relatively cheap to produce: a small crew can be dispatched to
the crime scene for an extended period of time to cover the police
bulletins, attorney press conferences, the courtroom activity, and
interviews with friends, neighbors, and family of the victim and
perpetrator. Second, the length of these proceedings allows for
suspense to mount among the public, and for growing interest to
translate into higher ratings as new developments emerge.126
The nature of television as a visual medium also plays a role in
determining the amount and kind of crime coverage on national and
local television. As Susan Bandes has noted, television emphasizes
“filmic” stories—“discrete, dramatic, visual incidents between
individuals.”127 Coverage of the investigation and trial of violent
crime fits this profile because it is dramatic and lends itself to
replays of the gory details of the crime itself, as the appellate
process generally does not. In contrast, television is less well suited
to covering procedural failures in individual cases or the system as
a whole.128
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showing people thinking on television is not very interesting).
129. See, e.g., PAUL D. KLITE ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN MEDIA WATCH, PAVLOV’S TV DOGS:
A SNAPSHOT OF LOCAL TV NEWS IN AMERICA 3 tbl.2 (1995) (stating that crime accounted for
30.2% of the average news broadcast on 99 stations on a single day in 1995); Center for
Media and Public Affairs, Assessing Local News Coverage of Health Issues, http://www.
cmpa.com/studies/AssessingLocalNews.htm (last visited Oct 5, 2006) (reporting that crime
accounted for 20% of the 17,000 local news broadcasts and was the most common topic);
Press Release, Rocky Mountain Media Watch, Survey Examines Excesses and Improvements
in Local TV Newscasts Across the U.S. (Aug. 4, 1998), available at http://www.
bigmedia.org/texts5.html (stating that crime accounted for 26.9% of the average news
broadcast on 102 stations in a single day in 1998).
130. Wally Dean & Lee Ann Brady, After 9/11, Has Anything Changed?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 94 (“[T]o make room for that coverage of defense and
foreign affairs, local TV chipped away at the coverage of everything but crime and disaster.”).
131. HAMILTON, supra note 80, at 242.
132. Id. at 239 (controlling for many demographic factors, and finding that viewers who
report higher consumption of violent entertainment programs are more likely to watch local
news with a crime emphasis, and more likely to follow national or international news that
involves violence, such as military conflicts).
133. Id. at 249.
2. Local News
Various studies in the 1990s found that crime is the number one
topic on local television news.129 One recent study also shows that
the events of September 11 have not changed this trend; in fact,
crime accounted for one-quarter of all stories on local television
news both before and after the terrorist attacks.130 Crime coverage
dominates local news programming, and local stations manipulate
crime and violence as a marketing strategy. Viewers with a taste
for violent entertainment media also have a taste for local news
with an emphasis on crime, and stations treat local news, like
entertainment programming, as a commercial product that they
adjust to meet their target audience’s interests.131 For that reason,
the incidence of crime stories in the local news bears no relation to
crime in that area. James Hamilton’s study of 16,000 local news
stories from fifty-seven stations in nineteen different markets found
that the emphasis on crime in the local news depends not on actual
crime in the area, but on viewer interest in violent programming.132
Furthermore, a station’s selection of news topics and style of
presentation is critical for establishing a brand identity in the local
television market, which in turn influences its value to various
advertisers.133
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134. Id. at 245-46.
135. Id. at 249.
136. Id. at 251-52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at 249.
138. Id. at 271 tbl.2.14.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 264.
142. Id. at 266.
Hamilton found that a wide range of crime coverage existed, from
17% to 42% of the newscasts, and that among these stories 7% to
70% dealt with murder.134 The “[h]igh-crime” stations shared many
commonalities. They were more likely to present crime in a style
that evoked entertainment: fast-paced, heavy use of dramatic video
clips, fewer verbal explanations, and teasers throughout the
broadcast for multiple stories on crime.135 Crime coverage was
negatively correlated with coverage of hard news on public affairs,
and positively correlated with accidents, military stories, health
stories, and “news you can use.”136 Given its feature focus, high-
crime stations not surprisingly trained their stories more on the
crime commission and the alleged perpetrator than the workings of
the criminal justice system.137
High-crime coverage by a station did not reflect high crime in the
local area. Hamilton showed that the number of crimes occurring
in a given market did not have a significant statistical impact on
the proportion of crime stories.138 Instead, the characteristics of
the viewing market determined whether a local news station would
choose crime as a top story. For example, a one-point ratings in-
crease in Cops, a quasi-reality crime show, was associated with a
5% increase in proportion of lead stories on crime.139 By contrast, a
one-point ratings increase for the network nightly news, thought to
indicate a greater interest in hard news, correlated with a 1.5%
drop in lead crime stories.140 The larger the percentage of adult
women in a viewing market, the lower the fraction of news devoted
to crime.141 Similarly, a one-point ratings increase in Melrose Place,
an evening soap popular among women between the ages of 18 and
34, correlated with a 2% decrease in lead crime stories.142 Hamilton
observed a clear segmentation of stations in their approach to crime
coverage in the local news. Stations were more likely to cover crime
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143. Id. at 276.
144. Neil Hickey, Money Lust: How Pressure for Profit Is Perverting Journalsim, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., July/Aug. 1998, at 28, 29-31 (stating that shareholders such as mutual
funds, insurance companies, and pension funds care little about journalism and pressure
publicly owned media companies to maintain or increase profits).
145. Id. at 35-36.
146. Marc Gunther, Publish or Perish?, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 148.
147. See DOUG UNDERWOOD, WHEN MBAS RULE THE NEWSROOM: HOW THE MARKETERS
AND MANAGERS ARE RESHAPING TODAY’S MEDIA 15 (1993) (describing “a new kind of editor,
a cross between an editor and a marketing official”).
148. See, e.g., Russ Baker, Murdoch’s Mean Machine, 37 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
May/June 1998, at 52 (describing how Murdoch papers promote other Murdoch ventures; for
example, the Adelaide Advertiser promoted a Murdoch pay television channel in news
articles, and the Sun in London reversed its opposition to the Millennium Dome after
Murdoch’s BSkyB satellite service became an investor in the project).
stories or lead broadcasts with a focus on crime as the likely
audience for crime coverage increased, measured by either the
ratings for Cops or an increase in the number of younger viewers.143
3. Newspapers
Economic factors have also reshaped the newspaper industry and
its crime reporting. In newspapers, as in television, we are in an era
of market-driven journalism. In general, newspapers are publicly
owned, and they face pressures to generate high profit margins
for shareholders144 at a time of declining readership and intense
competition from other media sources. In response to these
pressures, newspaper owners and top management have empha-
sized cost cutting and content designed to attract readers, and as a
result the traditional wall between the editorial and market-
ing/advertising departments in newspapers has dissolved.145 The
most famous example is that of the Los Angeles Times, where
CEO Mark Willes reorganized the newsroom “along the lines of a
consumer products company, with brand managers and profit-
and-loss statements for each section of the paper.”146 Newspaper
editors are increasingly expected to consider marketing as well as
traditional journalistic considerations.147 Stories in newspapers are
often determined not by what the press thinks the public needs to
know, but on what the public wants to know, and by opportunities
for marketing and the interests of corporate owners and sponsors.148
This has shifted content from hard news about national and
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149. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 147, at 1-11 (describing studies and programs of
American Newspaper Publishers Association and American Society of Newspaper Editors in
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THOMAS E. PATTERSON, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: HOW SOFT NEWS AND CRITICAL
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150. Lou Ureneck, Newspapers Arrive at Economic Crossroads, NIEMAN REPORTS, Summer
1999 Special Issue, at 5, available at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/99-SpNRspecial
99/NRspecial99.pdf.
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international affairs to soft features frequently linked to advertiser
interests, such as mutual fund investing and vacation planning.
Crime reporting continues to be a popular theme because of the low
cost to produce the stories and the potential for particularly
sensational crime stories to attract readers’ attention. The cost-
effectiveness of crime and its attractiveness to readers are critical
in an industry that is increasingly focused on the bottom line.
Regular newspaper readership, which has been declining since
the 1950s, began to drop steeply in the late 1970s, and this led to
pressure to redesign newspapers in ways that would make them
more attractive to contemporary readers.149 Declining circulation
and advertising revenue left newspapers with the choice of cutting
costs or accepting lower profits in what has traditionally been a
highly profitable industry. Inland Press Association, which has
been analyzing financial data of newspapers for many years, found
in its latest survey of 425 newspaper operations that cutting costs
has been the preferred choice. Inland turned up six major trends:
investments in news coverage, production expenses, and payroll
were down, but investments in marketing, revenue, and profits
increased.150 The biggest change for journalism has been the
increased involvement of advertising and marketing personnel in
shaping news content. Focus groups, reader polls, and a consumer
product sales orientation were completely foreign—and for some,
abhorrent—to newsrooms traditionally led by values of independent
news judgment, editorial detachment, and “give-them-what-they-
need,” not what-they-want reporting.151 Some leading papers and
chains, such as USA Today and the many papers owned by Rupert
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95-103.
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155. Ureneck, supra note 150, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). The desirability
of these topics was largely confirmed by a major recent study of newspaper readership led
by the Media Management Center of Northwestern University. Surveying 37,000 readers of
100 newspapers across America, they found that the topics with the greatest potential to
increase readership were (1) news about community and ordinary people; (2) health, home,
food, fashion, and travel; (3) politics and government; (4) natural disasters and accidents;
and (5) movies, television, and weather. READERSHIP INSTITUTE, MEDIA MGMT. CTR. AT
NORTHWESTERN UNIV., THE POWER TO GROW READERSHIP: RESEARCH FROM THE IMPACT
STUDY OF NEWSPAPER READERSHIP 8 (2001), http://www.readership.org/consumers/building/
imperatives/data/Revised%20Report.pdf.
156. UNDERWOOD, supra note 147, at 20.
157. Ureneck, supra note 150, at 16.
Murdoch, blazed the way, and competitors felt intense pressure to
keep up.152
In the 1990s, newspapers found that they needed to maintain a
critical mass of readers in a specific demographic market in order
to be perceived as desirable to potential advertisers.153 In his study
of newsroom change, Doug Underwood talked to reporters across
the country who complained about things such as the “puffy special
sections” designed for the Dallas Morning News’s affluent readers,
or developing special stories that would appeal to Hispanics in the
Miami Herald.154 The magic formula appeared to be local commu-
nity news, celebrity news, “useful news” such as buying a car or
retirement planning, and coverage of hot topics like health.155
Not all newspapers have restructured their newsrooms on the
basis of marketing data. This trend is more prevalent among the
chain newspapers that are publicly owned. Publicly held newspaper
companies have maintained pretax profits of 20% to 40%, a per-
formance that Wall Street wants to maintain.156 Market segmenta-
tion and customer-driven news was the publicly held papers’
response to the attack on profits by intense competition for readers
as media outlets expanded in quantity and immediacy. In contrast,
family-owned newspapers, such as the New York Times and the
Washington Post, have structured their newspapers’ stock such that
they maintain control. “These families have maintained an interest
that goes beyond making money,” notably the prestige of the paper
in the world of journalism and politics.157 Underwood’s survey of
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160. See FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 89, at 64-67; DAVID J. KRAJICEK, SCOOPED!: MEDIA
MISS REAL STORY ON CRIME WHILE CHASING SEX, SLEAZE, AND CELEBRITIES 96 (1998).
161. KRAJICEK, supra note 160, at 96. 
162. Id. at 104. 
163. Id. at 13.
164. Id. at 98.
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429 staff members in twelve daily newspapers in California, Idaho,
and Washington supports the conclusion that large-chain newspa-
pers emphasize the reader as a customer, whereas the independ-
ently owned newspapers are noteworthy for traditional journalistic
values in determining the news.158
How do the general trends toward news content that is deter-
mined by reader interest affect crime reporting? According to the
Readership Institute, readers have less interest in crime than the
editors realize, indicating that they prefer a more local focus to
crime coverage, fewer national events, fewer photos, and fewer
stories overall.159 Nonetheless, crime reporting remains a staple for
newspapers, and is increasingly presented in a more tabloid style.160
Crime stories are attractive because newspaper editors can always
rely on a police reporter to fill space in the newspaper (“newshole”)
reliably and cheaply. The reporter on the police beat goes to the
station each day and collects the arrest reports, crime reports, and
accident reports as potential stories.161 Big city police departments
assist by screening the crimes and presenting the media with
detailed information on major cases, often written up in a press
release for ease of use.162 In most cases, the police reporter would
also be expected to cover any celebrity arrests or sexy crimes,
leaving little to no time for any attention to crime trends or the
police department’s performance.163 Should there be insufficient
local crime news, editors can always turn to the wire services (for
example, the Associated Press) for crime stories from other parts of
the country.164 Unless a sensational crime has occurred precisely in
the newspaper’s market, like the Los Angeles Times reporting on
the O.J. Simpson case, most news of such crimes will come across
the wire services.165
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BY SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=156.
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169. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, INTERNET SAPPING BROADCAST
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Front-page newspaper headlines about the leading crime stories
have a tabloid style, implying reader familiarity with the case,
either through continuous printing of the wire-service updates by
their local paper, or through other media. Indeed, the increasing
quantity of coverage in major newspapers of cases like the JonBenet
Ramsey murder investigation or the William Kennedy Smith rape
trial corresponds with a decline in sales of traditional tabloids such
as the National Enquirer and the Star.166 The expansion of tabloid
content in their regular newspaper apparently has undermined the
market for the tabloid rags.
4. New Media and Shifts in Media Choice
Increasing evidence suggests that many news consumers are
turning away from traditional media outlets in favor of new media
sources, such as the Internet, all-news cable stations, and political
talk radio. These new media are still evolving, and relatively little
is known about their coverage of crime, though it may parallel the
treatment of crime in the established media.
The number of Americans who report that they read a newspaper
or watch local or national news has dropped precipitously, and
online and cable news outlets have gained a significant share of the
market. Between 1993 and 2002, local television news consumption
dropped from 77% to 57% of all Americans, nightly network news
consumption dropped from 60% to 32%, and newspaper consump-
tion dropped from 58% to 41%.167 Meanwhile, online and cable news
outlets gained large audiences rapidly. In 2002, 33% of Americans
watched cable television news daily, and 25% checked news online
at least three days per week.168 Internet users also trust online
news, with one survey finding higher ratings for the online sites of
major national news organizations than for the news organizations
themselves.169 A 2002 survey also found that users rated cable
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at http://www.journalist.org/Programs/StudyText.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2002) (stating
that 47% of respondents also said “that ‘online news is more up-to-date than other news
sources’”).
171. See SUSAN TOLCHIN, THE ANGRY AMERICAN: HOW VOTER RAGE IS CHANGING THE
NATION 92 (1995); Stephen Earl Bennett, Predicting Americans’ Exposure to Political Talk
Radio in 1996, 1998, and 2000, 7 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 9, 9 (2002) (measuring the size
of the political talk radio audience in different years and identifying the factors that predict
exposure).
172.  Gangheong Lee & Joseph N. Cappella, The Effects of Political Talk Radio on Political
Attitude Formation: Exposure Versus Knowledge, 18 POL. COMM. 369, 369 (2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Other radio call-in shows emphasize topics such as sports and
entertainment.
173. Bennett, supra note 171, at 18.
174. RICHARD DAVIS & DIANA OWEN, NEW MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 167-76 (1998).
175. Lee & Cappella, supra note 172, at 382.
176. Doris A. Graber, The ‘New’ Media and Politics: What Does the Future Hold?, PS: POL.
SCI. & POL., Mar. 1996, at 33.
television websites as the third-most credible news source out of
sixteen choices, before both national network news and national
radio broadcasts.170
Since its introduction in 1989, political talk radio has also
changed the media landscape.171 Talk radio is composed of “[c]all-in
shows that emphasize discussion of politicians, elections, and public
policy issues.”172 Both the audience and the format of talk radio
differ from that of more traditional news media. Talk radio attracts
news consumers who are interested in politics and distrustful of the
mass media.173 Talk radio listeners are also more conservative,
more politically knowledgeable, and have less faith in the national
government than the general public.174 Talk radio eschews the
objective format used by traditional sources.175 Because talk radio
differs so significantly from traditional news media, it is difficult to
categorize. Like network television newsmagazines, talk radio tests
the boundaries of what should be considered news media as opposed
to entertainment programming.
The new media options are still evolving, and no consensus exists
on whether they will prove to be fundamentally different than
traditional news media. One influential commentator has suggested
that the Internet may end up as nothing more than a clone of
existing technologies, adding little that is really new or that
enriches the information supply.176 At the present time, most
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sites including Yahoo! News, AOL News, CNN, MSNBC, and other media-sponsored sites).
178. Larry Pryor, Executive Editor, Online Journalism Rev., The Third Wave of Online
Journalism (Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.ojr.org/ojr/future/1019174689.php. Pryor explains the
history of online journalism by dividing it into three waves. Id. The first wave, from 1982 to
1992, consisted mostly of proprietary online services that charged users. Id. The second
wave, from 1993 to 2001, was the dot com boom in which most providers began offering
content for free. Id. The third wave, which began in 2001, is defined by sophisticated
business structures and content providers developing products for which consumers are
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179. Id.
180. Laurence Zuckerman, Questions Abound as Media Influence Grows for a Handful,
in LIVING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 139 (Erik P. Bucy ed., 2002) (showing that, although fifty
companies controlled most of the mass media in 1983, this number shrunk to a mere six by
2000).
181. DAVIS & OWEN, supra note 174, at 252.
182. See, e.g., Steve Donohue, Behind the Headlines at Revamped News, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Aug. 6, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA150149.html
(reporting that CNN was relaunching its Headline News with a new format, new look,
Internet news sites are not independently owned, but rather are
counterparts of other media outlets, such as nytimes.com or
television network websites.177 There were popular Internet-only
newsgathering sources in the 1990s, but many of these disappeared
during the dot com bust.178 As a result, Internet users have become
more dependent on traditional news organizations’ websites, which
withstood the market collapse.179 Media consolidation also limits
the flow of information. A small number of media conglomerates
control most of the mass media, with one company often owning a
combination of networks, cable stations, newspapers, and other
outlets.180 Finally, new media sources may not be much less
objective than traditional sources. On the whole, the new media
focus more on broadening its audience than conveying any particu-
lar political message, and tends more toward entertainment than
serious policy debate.181 Consequently, new media sources may
simply reiterate the same information as traditional sources.
Moreover, the new media, like the traditional media, face strong
economic pressures. CNN, the originator of cable news, has suffered
declines in its ratings in the face of challengers, and has made
efforts to revise its format and coverage to attract viewers, espe-
cially younger viewers.182
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anchor team, and graphics package aimed at attracting adults aged twenty-five to fifty-four,
and noting CNN’s hiring of former NYPD Blue actress Andrea Thompson as an anchor
following her brief reporting stint at an Albuquerque station); Tom Dorsey, New Studio and
Format, COURIER-J. (Louisiville, Ky.), Aug. 6, 2001, at 2E (noting that CNN is “obviously
trying to keep up with the breezy Fox format that emphasizes tabloid-type reporting with
lots of attitude”).
183. Graber, supra note 176, at 33 (arguing that the most important change induced by
the proliferation of new media options is the empowerment of media users, but also
admitting that Americans will not experience increased exposure to political information).
184. Id. at 34 (explaining that the interactive feature of new media gives consumers access
to more political information).
185. Judith Shulevitz, The Close Reader—At Large in the Blogosphere, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 2002, § 7, at 31 (reporting that some blogs, short for “weblogs,” attract thousands of
readers every month). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and
Economics of Amateur Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185 (2006) (discussing the legal
and economic impacts of blogging).
However, some distinctive aspects set new media apart from
traditional media. The new media sources give consumers greater
control over when and where they receive information, allowing
individuals to self-select stories that interest them.183 This is more
a difference in degree than kind, because users of traditional news
media can self-select stories simply by changing the channel during
news broadcasts or skipping over articles in newspapers. Both the
Internet and political talk radio have an interactive format that
may have an impact on the stories consumers choose and how they
interpret those stories.184 By interacting instantly with news
organizations and other consumers around the world through chat
rooms and message boards, users can reach millions of different
viewpoints. They can also express their own opinions through a less
cumbersome process than old methods, such as writing a letter to
the editor. The Internet also gives news consumers more options;
rather than limiting users to one media format, websites offer audio
and video clips as well as print articles. Similarly, the sheer volume
of information on the Internet offers endless access to resources,
including vast archive systems. Finally, the Internet’s lack of
regulation allows entrepreneurial news vendors to publish “blogs”
to reach thousands of news consumers.185 
No research quantifies crime coverage in the new media, though
there are many indications that crime stories are as ubiquitous in
the new media as in traditional news media. Crime stories appear
to be a staple of cable television news, and critics have condemned
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media coverage, see Matt Welch, Media Criticism Gone Horribly Wrong (Apr. 2, 2002),
http://www.ojr.org/ojr/ethics/1017782279.php.
189. Alesia I. Redding, Media Reap Outrageous Fortune for Scandals, S. BEND TRIB., Aug.
12, 2001, at E1. All day household ratings also increased at both networks: a 20% increase
for MSNBC, and an 82% increase for Fox News. Id. CNN had a 24% increase in household
ratings and a 30% increase in household audience. Id. CNN’s Larry King Live program
experienced its highest ratings for the summer when it focused on the Levy story. Don
Kaplan, The Chandra Effect Boosts Cable News, N.Y. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at 73. Although the
networks acknowledged that the increases were due at least in part to their coverage of the
Levy story, they did suggest it was not the only factor. See Cable-News Viewership Jumps
Amid Levy Coverage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2001, at E8, available at 2001 WLNR
10872166.
190. Allison Romano, Shocking Fox News Gains!; CNN Feels the Heat, USA Continues To
Decline in July Cable Ratings, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 6, 2001, at 14.
191. Howard Kurtz, MSNBC Reaches for Viewers with Sex and Crime “News” Television,
L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2000, at 10 (explaining that, in order to reach the coveted 25- to 54-year
old demographic, MSNBC introduced a “‘celebrities and tabloid’ approach” to programming).
192. JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA ET AL., ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PA.,
the cable networks’ drawn-out coverage of high-profile crime
stories,186 claiming that all-day reporting of one story creates “an
unnecessarily painful national psychodrama.”187 For example, all
cable networks devoted enormous coverage to the story of missing
Washington, D.C. intern Chandra Levy, and they reportedly reaped
a ratings bonanza.188 Comparing ratings from 2001, when the Levy
story was at its peak, to July 2000, MSNBC’s average household
audience increased 39%, and Fox News’s increased 149%.189 The
cable channels’ coverage of the case included Fox New’s broadcast
of psychics attempting to contact Levy.190 The cable networks’ focus
on tabloid-style news programs is seen as a strategy to attract
young viewers.191 Crime has also been the focus of political talk
radio, at least during some recent periods: a 1996 study found that
radio hosts devoted more time to crime than any other subject,
including foreign affairs, the federal budget, and the President.192
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political_comm unication/archive/1996_03_political-talk-radio_rpt.PDF (analyzing topics
discussed on three days of political talk radio programming and finding that crime accounted
for 17% of all topics, whereas foreign affairs accounted for 12.5%, the federal budget
accounted for 11.8%, and the President accounted for 2%).
193. See Public Agenda, Crime: People’s Chief Concerns, http://www.publicagenda.org/
issues/pcc_detail.cfm?issue_type=crime&list=4 (last visited Oct. 5, 2006) (reporting results
of an ABC News poll from June 2000). 
194. AM. BAR ASS’N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 94-95 (1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf.
195. The Gallup Organization, Gallup Brain, July 13-14, 1998 (reporting that 66% of
individuals trust network news broadcasts and 73% trust the local television news). The
questions used to compile this poll data are available at http://brain.gallup.com/documents/
questionnaire.arpx?STUDY=CNN9807020.
196. DAVID L. PALETZ, THE MEDIA IN AMERICAN POLITICS: CONTENTS AND CONSEQUENCES
117-18 (2d ed. 2002). 
B. How the Media Treatment of Crime Affects Public Opinion and
Criminal Justice Policy
Americans report that they get critical information about crime
from the media. For example, in one national survey, 81% of
respondents said that they based their view of how bad the crime
problem is on what they have read or seen in the news, rather than
on their personal experience.193 In an American Bar Association poll
asking respondents to identify “extremely or very important”
sources of information on the criminal justice system, 41% of
respondents identified television news, 37% identified primetime
newsmagazines, and 36% identified local newspapers.194 Most
people also trust the accuracy and fairness of the information
received from these sources.195 But how does the information
gleaned from the news media affect public opinion about criminal
justice policies?
Scholarship on the media includes a wide range of theories. At
one extreme, some scholars have argued that the news media is
extremely powerful, and that it can inject particular points of view
into its audience.196 At the other extreme, scholars have contended
that the media has minimal effects on individuals because of
various mediating conditions, including their selective exposure to
media they find congenial to their views, selective perception in
accordance with preexisting beliefs, and selective retention of
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201. See generally Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds, News Influence on Our Pictures
of the World, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (Jennings Bryant &
Dolf Zillman eds., 2d ed. 2002) (providing a general overview of several studies that support
the media’s agenda-setting effect).
material consistent with their own views and preferences.197 At
present, the data do not appear to support the strongest view of the
media as being able to completely determine the attitudes and
opinions of media consumers. However, strong evidence indicates
that the media plays an important role in increasing the importance
of crime to the public, and both experimental simulations and
survey research support the view that the contemporary media
coverage increases support for punitive policies.198 Although the
news media is certainly not the only influence on public opinion, the
media interacts with and reinforces other key influences, such as
American culture and politics, to increase punitiveness.
1. Mechanisms that Increase Crime Salience
Data collected from hundreds of experimental simulations and
surveys have confirmed the media’s “agenda-setting” and “priming”
effects. Agenda setting refers to the media’s ability to direct the
public’s attention to certain issues,199 whereas priming describes the
media’s ability to affect the criteria by which viewers judge public
policies, public officials, or candidates for office.200 When combined,
the two phenomena show that the media’s emphasis on crime
makes the issue more salient in the minds of viewers and readers,
which causes the public to perceive crime as a more severe problem
than real world figures indicate. 
More than 350 empirical studies conducted worldwide support
the media’s power to set the public’s agenda.201 The effect was first
discovered after scholars found an extremely high correlation (.975)
between the rank order in salience of the issues reported in news
coverage of the presidential campaign, and in the salience rank
order of the issues that undecided voters said were the campaign’s
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206. See IYENGAR & KINDER, supra note 203, at 19 & tbl.3.1 (evaluating issues such as
defense, inflation, pollution, arms control, civil rights, and unemployment). 
207. Id. at 20. For example, pollution as the “most important” national problem moved
from fifth to second place after participants saw a newscast about pollution. Id.
208. Id. at 25.
key issues.202 Many subsequent studies have replicated these
findings, reporting a link between national surveys asking respon-
dents about the country’s most important problem, and news
coverage of the same issues.203 Survey data have also shown that
the agenda-setting effect is particularly strong when networks place
certain stories as the “lead stories” of broadcasts204 and when
individuals lack personal experience with an issue.205 
The agenda-setting effect has also been demonstrated in experi-
mental simulations. In one study, for example, individuals that
initially had identical opinions about the priority of several national
issues changed their priorities after viewing a newscast emphasiz-
ing an issue,206 whereas a control group’s priorities remained the
same.207 Perhaps more important, the emphasis of the manipulated
footage had a persistent effect on viewers, which indicates that
these effects may extend into the real world setting. For example,
participants who had been exposed to a single story on unemploy-
ment continued, one week later, to nominate unemployment as one
of the country’s most important problems more frequently than did
those who saw no stories about unemployment.208 
After the news increases the salience of certain issues by agenda
setting, the media then primes audiences to believe that those
issues warrant more political attention. The concept of priming
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209. Id. at 64.
210. Id. at 68. This priming effect emerged in several independent tests on the issues of
arms control, civil rights, defense, inflation, unemployment, and energy; it emerged from
both positive and negative stories; and it affected the issues on which the public evaluated
Democratic and Republican presidents. Id. at 115.
211. The priming phenomenon is similar to an error in cognition that scholars call
“availability.” Opinions are affected by the cognitive availability of various occurrences and
examples. For example, the media’s increased coverage of murders and other violent crimes
leads to exaggerated public estimates of the frequency of such crimes. Similarly, heightened
coverage of one particularly horrible event may shape public opinion about the whole
criminal justice system. See Beale, supra note 2, at 58-59.
212. McCombs & Reynolds, supra note 201, at 14. For example, a post-1986 National
Election Study revealed that the factors on which the public assessed Ronald Reagan’s job
performance changed after heavy news coverage of the Iran-Contra scandal. Id. Voters
became much more concerned with the President’s ability to deal with foreign affairs issues,
especially those concerning Central America. Id. A subsequent study found a link between
frequency of media use and overall support for Bill Clinton during the Monica Lewinsky sex
scandal. Individuals who read newspapers and watched television were more likely to focus
on this issue when evaluating Clinton’s performance. Id. But see Joanne M. Miller & Jon A.
Krosnick, News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically
Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted Source, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 301, 312 (2000)
(concluding that priming occurs only in the minds of those who trust the news media most
and who know the most about political issues, whereas “politically naive citizens” are less
affected by media priming).
213. Nicholas A. Valentino, Crime News and the Priming of Racial Attitudes During
Evaluations of the President, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 293, 293-320 (1999). Valentino showed
adult residents of Los Angeles a regular television newscast into which he had inserted local
television news footage of a police operation to arrest suspected gang members. Id. at 301-02.
rests on cognitive accessibility theory, which states that when
people make judgments they use subconscious shortcuts, such as
relying on the most accessible information, particularly recently
acquired information and commonly accepted stock stories.209 Media
scholars first discovered the priming effect by using survey results
to examine how the public evaluated presidential performance.
When television news repeatedly drew attention to certain issues,
the importance of these problems as criteria upon which to base an
overall assessment of the President more than doubled.210 Further
research has supported these findings and shown that information
the news media makes readily available211 becomes more important
when the public assesses presidential performance.212 
Experimental simulations have linked the priming effect to
crime, showing that news stories about crime can prime the public’s
view of presidential candidates, and that this effect is linked to
racial attitudes.213 Researchers found that the insertion of crime
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All references to race were removed from the narrative; the only racial cue was a five-second
mug shot of two suspects of like race. Id. at 302. Through digital manipulation, different
study groups viewed the suspects as white, black, Asian, and Hispanic males; a fifth group
saw the crime footage with no mug shots; and the control group watched the newscast
without the crime story at all. Id.
214. Id. at 304-12. Stereotypes about Republican and Democratic approaches to crime may
have played a role. Valentino assumed that even though Clinton worked hard to distance
himself from the traditional “‘soft-on-crime’ Democratic stereotype,” the Republicans and
their standard bearer, Bob Dole, still had greater credibility on the law-and-order issue. Id.
at 298 & n.2. Accordingly, Valentino hypothesized that exposure to crime news, particularly
when it featured minority suspects, would depress Clinton’s overall support and boost Dole’s.
Id. at 298-99. 
215. Id. at 305. The study used a 100-point “‘feeling thermometer’ scale” to measure
participants’ attitudes toward the candidates. Id. at 302 n.8.
216. Id. at 305.
217. Valentino relied upon the existence of common public perceptions that Republicans
were the party that best represents whites, whereas Clinton was perceived as having
especially good rapport with minority communities. Id. at 298. Valentino postulated that
crime news should prime Clinton’s performance on crime as a predictor of his overall
support, and that this effect would be especially prominent among those exposed to minority
suspects. Id. at 299. 
218. Salma Ismail Ghanem, Media Coverage of Crime and Public Opinion: An Exploration
of the Second Level of Agenda Setting (May 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Texas at Austin) (on file with author). Ghanem conducted statewide surveys
in Texas to determine public opinion about crime. In 1992 only 2% of respondents to the poll
stories into a real local news broadcast primed participants to
consider crime in evaluating their support for candidates Bill
Clinton and Bob Dole.214 Although Clinton had a large lead over
Dole when participants viewed a newscast with no crime footage,
his lead was cut by more than 25% when they saw a newscast with
crime footage featuring no suspect or a white suspect.215 Priming
the audience with racial images had an even more dramatic effect;
when minority suspects were featured in the simulation footage,
Clinton’s lead was cut in half.216 Apparently the racial cues brought
stereotypes about party race allegiances to the forefront of viewers’
minds.217 
Recent surveys verify the conclusions of the simulation studies,
finding evidence that the media’s agenda-setting and priming
effects have directed public attention to the issue of crime. One
study conducted during a period when local crime rates were
falling found a .70 correlation between elevated public concern
about crime and crime stories in the local newspapers, and an even
higher correlation when the stories appeared on the front page.218
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stated that crime was the most important problem facing the country; by the fall of 1993 the
number had jumped to 15%. Id. at 49 tbl.1. In two polls in the first six months of 1994, the
number reached more than 37%. Id. Ghanem found a correlation of .70 between the number
of news stories about crime and the percentage of the public identifying crime as the most
important problem facing the country (and a correlation of .73 after excluding stories about
the atypical prosecution of O.J. Simpson and the killer of Tejano singer Selena). Id. at 65.
There was a .86 correlation between the number of front page crime stories and the public’s
identification of crime as the top public concern. Id. at 68.
219. See FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 89, at 128-29. Researchers asked one group of
respondents about their overall opinion of the criminal justice system, and then about
individual sensational crimes, whereas the other was first primed by questions concerning
the specific tabloid cases, and then asked about their confidence in criminal justice
institutions. Id. at 131.
220. Id. at 132-33 & tbl.4.3.
221. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
222. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
Additionally, the influence of media coverage of tabloid crime cases
has been found to affect public confidence in the criminal justice
system. Researchers found that respondents who had been primed
with reminders of high-profile cases, such as the O.J. Simpson trial
or the JonBenet Ramsey murder investigation,219 expressed lower
levels of confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole; and
less confidence in individual actors within the system, such as the
police, judges, juries, and prosecuting attorneys, than in those who
had not.220
2. Mechanisms that Produce Increased Punitiveness
Although there is strong evidence of the news media’s ability to
increase the public’s view of the importance of crime, the specific
mechanisms increasing public support for harsher punishments are
less well understood. Scholars from several disciplines—including
media studies, political science, and criminology—have proposed
different theories to explain the media-punitiveness relationship,
but no consensus has emerged. Some have attributed heightened
punitiveness to the media’s framing effect, which is achieved
through the episodic framing of stories and the use of stock
scripts.221 Other scholars have blamed the media for instilling fear
in viewers, which provokes an affective response.222 Still others
posit that the media’s presentation of crime in racial terms triggers
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223. See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
224. See infra Part IV.B.3.
225. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, J.
COMM., Dec. 1993, at 52 (emphasis omitted).
226. PERSE, supra note 199, at 106. Framing can also impact audiences’ ability to recall
information. Patti M. Valkenburg et al., The Effects of News Frames on Readers’ Thoughts
and Recall, 26 COMM. RES. 550 (1999) (finding that framing newspaper articles in terms of
human interest diminished respondents’ ability to recall the core information about a crime
story). News is often framed in terms of human interest to make stories more interesting and
compelling, but the findings of Valkenburg and her coauthors suggest that the emotional
human-interest frame may actually diminish recollection by distracting attention away from
the facts, disrupting readers’ information-processing capacities, or by inducing cynicism in
readers.
227. PERSE, supra note 199, at 100.
racism and makes individuals more punitive.223 Despite not
agreeing on the exact mechanisms that produce the relationship
between media and punitiveness, scholars across disciplines
generally agree that a link does exist. They also agree that news
reporting affects people’s attitudes in different ways depending on
several factors, including their existing views, their past experi-
ences, and their demographic characteristics.224
a. Framing
Several media scholars have linked increased punitiveness to the
internal structural emphasis of crime stories, which they refer to
as “framing.” The media frames stories when it “select[s] some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation.”225 Framing is significant because it
activates some ideas, feelings, and values more than others, and
thus encourages particular trains of thought and leads audiences to
arrive at certain conclusions.226 Scholarship correlating framing
with increased punitiveness has focused on two main aspects: the
episodic framing of stories and the use of stock scripts.
Television news coverage tends to be presented in either episodic
or thematic frames, and the choice of frame may affect punitive-
ness.227 Episodic frames are more common, as they focus on
particular events or individuals—the bread and butter of daily
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228. Id.
229. Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for Political Issues, ANNALS, July 1996, at
62.
230. Paul M. Kellstedt, Media Framing and the Dynamics of Racial Policy Preferences, 44
AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 254-57 (2000). Kellstedt divided media coverage on race into two
categories—egalitarianism and individualism—and analyzed how shifts in coverage impacted
racial policy preferences. Id. at 249. He hypothesized that when stories focused on
“individualism,” the idea that people should get ahead on their own without government
assistance, people would be more inclined to favor conservative policies. Id. at 249-50.
Conversely, when stories emphasized “egalitarianism,” the idea that everyone deserves equal
opportunities, people would support liberal policies. Id. at 250. Although the findings did
support his hypothesis, Kellstedt noted that the shifts in policy preferences were very subtle.
Id. at 257.
231. Iyengar, supra note 229, at 278. For example, news that dwelt on a particular poor
person encouraged viewers to blame the victim for his predicament, whereas news on
increases in the number of Americans at poverty level and national food emergencies elicited
attribution of poverty to societal causes. Id.
232. See John K. Cochran et al., Attribution Styles and Attitudes Toward Capital
Punishment for Juveniles, the Mentally Incompetent, and the Mentally Retarded, 20 JUST. Q.
65, 66-67 (2003). Controlling for demographic factors, the authors found that individuals who
adhere to a “dispositional attribution style” and blame crime on internal characteristics of
offenders are more supportive of capital punishment for juvenile, mentally incompetent, and
mentally retarded offenders than those who adhere to a “situational attribution style” and
blame crime on extrinsic factors. Id. at 83.
news.228 By contrast, news presented in a thematic frame would
address a broader social, political, or economic issue, buttressed by
relevant statistics, expert commentary, and analysis.229 The choice
of frame influences the audience’s policy preferences. For example,
a recent study analyzing Newsweek articles found that changes in
the media’s framing of the race issue brought about subtle shifts in
racial policy preferences.230 Episodic framing encourages viewers to
blame problems on the individuals depicted, whereas thematic
framing diverts blame to larger social and political institutions.231
In the context of crime, episodic framing may lead to increased
support for punitive policies because individuals who attribute
crime to the personal characteristics of offenders have been found
to support more punitive measures than those who attribute the
problem to social factors.232 
Evidence also indicates that the media’s use of “stock stories” or
“scripts” may influence punitive attitudes and invoke racial
stereotypes. Cognitive psychologists define scripts as “coherent
sequence[s] of events expected by the individual, involving him
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233. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 561 (2000) (quoting Robert
P. Abelson, Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision Making, in COGNITION &
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 33 (John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976)).
234. Id.
235. CAPPELLA & JAMIESON, supra note 4, at 63.
236. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 233, at 561.
237. The standard script begins with the anchorperson announcing that a crime—usually
a violent one—has occurred, then takes the viewer to the scene for a closeup of the incident
and personal accounts by relatives of the victim and bystanders, and finally shifts to police
activities and the suspect’s identity, often limited to visual imagery that conveys his race or
ethnicity. Id.
238. The authors manipulated the main elements of a crime script within a larger local
news broadcast. Id. at 563. Some subjects watched a crime story in which the perpetrator
was an African American male; others saw the same story with a white male suspect. Id. A
third set of subjects watched a crime story that contained no information or graphic
concerning the perpetrator’s identity. Id. The control group viewed a newscast containing no
crime story. Id.
239. Id. at 564 (finding that participants exposed to the manipulated footage were more
attentive to information that validated their prior stored beliefs).
240. Id. 
241. Id. Although skin color and socially constructed racial groups are not identical, this
either as a participant or as an observer.”233 Scripts facilitate
comprehension by distilling knowledge into an orderly and predict-
able set of scenarios and roles, enabling individuals easily to make
inferences about events, issues, or behaviors.234 When media
coverage includes “salient cues,” individuals develop expectations
that lead them to select matching stories;235 “[i]n many cases
script-based expectations are so well developed that when people
encounter incomplete versions of the script, they actually ‘fill in’ the
missing information” based on the script.236 
Experimental simulations have shown that the standard script
for local news coverage of crime237 affects public opinion. Research-
ers found that individuals who had viewed different versions of a
newscast containing a typical crime segment238 filled in gaps in the
coverage using preexisting stereotypes.239 For example, more than
60% of the subjects who watched a broadcast that included no
perpetrator falsely recalled having seen one, and 70% of these
subjects identified the unseen perpetrator as African American.240
Participants who saw a black perpetrator were also more likely to
recall the presence of a perpetrator; those who saw a white
perpetrator were 50% less likely to recall any perpetrator.241
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Article uses the term “black” throughout because it is broader than the term “African
American.” 
242. Id. at 567-68; see also FRANK D. GILLIAM, JR., NAT’L FUNDING COLLABORATIVE ON
VIOLENCE PREVENTION, YOUTH CRIME AND THE SUPERPREDATOR NEWS FRAME: THE IMPACT
OF TELEVISION ON ATTITUDES ABOUT CRIME AND RACE, http://www.peacebeyondviolence.
org/res_mono_gil_youth.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2003) (reaching the same conclusion after
conducting a similar study that used youth perpetrators instead of adult perpetrators).
243. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 233, at 567-68. In contrast, black participants’
explanation for the cause of crime was unaffected by the manipulation. Id. Furthermore, for
black viewers, exposure to any variation of the crime script reduced support for punitive
crime policies. Id. For example, one experiment found that in ambiguous circumstances
heavy television news viewers who had previously viewed a black perpetrator were more
likely to rate a subsequent suspect whose race they did not know to be guilty. See Travis L.
Dixon, Schemas as Average Conceptions: Skin Tone, Television News Exposure, and
Culpability Judgments, 83 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 131 (2006). In this two-part
experiment, participants first watched a fictitious crime news story in which the race and
skin tone of the perpetrator varied. Next, participants read two crime scenarios in which a
race-unidentified suspect was either unambiguously guilty or ambiguously guilty.
Participants were then asked to rate the culpability of the suspects in each story. When the
guilt of the subsequent suspect was ambiguous, heavy television news viewers were more
likely to rate the suspect as culpable if they had previously viewed light-, medium-, or dark-
skinned black perpetrators than if exposed to white perpetrators. However, an interesting
anomaly appeared in the test condition of subsequent exposure to a suspect whose guilt was
unambiguous. In that situation, heavy television news viewers who had seen a medium-
skinned black perpetrator were more likely to rate a subsequent unambiguously guilty
perpetrator as culpable. No such culpability rating differences occurred among participants
who were light television news viewers, nor did they occur when the heavy viewers had been
exposed to light- or dark-skinned black perpetrators. Id.
244. In his presidential candidate study, Valentino found that study participants’ exposure
to racially stereotypic crime news increased the association between Clinton’s performance
on welfare issues and his overall evaluation. When minorities were portrayed as suspects in
a crime news segment, Clinton’s handling of welfare issues had a large and statistically
significant impact on his overall performance rating. Valentino, supra note 213, at 307-09.
By contrast, these same news segments did not prime Clinton’s performance on balancing
the budget or taxes, domains less obviously linked to race in the participants’ associative
network. Id.
The crime script’s racial element appears to be a significant cue
that triggers public opinion about crime and crime policy.242 For
example, exposure of white subjects to a black perpetrator or no
perpetrator significantly raised support for the view that crime is
caused by individual factors, rather than general social causes, and
also had the greatest impact on punitiveness, increasing support for
punitive policies by 6%.243 The crime script’s racial element may
even influence opinions about seemingly unrelated issues, such as
welfare,244 through a process called “spreading activation,” in which
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245. The stronger the association between nodes, the greater the likelihood that other
nodes will be brought into awareness. CAPPELLA & JAMIESON, supra note 4, at 61. 
246. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 233, at 570-71. The authors analyzed surveys in which
residents of Los Angeles County were asked about their local-television-news-viewing habits
and their attitudes on race and crime. Id.
247. The “new racism” index was developed to address the fact that calling blacks “lazy”
or “stupid” is now generally considered socially unacceptable. Id. at 566. If racism thus still
exists, it is manifested under a different guise referred to as new racism. Id. Gilliam and
Iyengar use Kinder and Sanders’s definition of new racism: “(1) a denial that discrimination
against African-Americans continues; (2) a sense that blacks have violated traditional
American values of hard work and self-reliance; (3) a perception that blacks make
illegitimate demands; and (4) the belief that blacks receive undeserved benefits from
government.” Id. (citing D.R. KINDER & L.M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS
AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996)).
248. Id. at 571.
a crime news story triggers awareness of other seemingly unrelated
issues by activating memory nodes.245
Because even the most carefully designed experimental simula-
tions cannot reproduce all of the real world’s features, researchers
have supplemented the simulation studies with survey research
designed to explore the influence of television crime news. A
comparison of the views of persons who reported watching televi-
sion news daily with other residents of the same area found that
the two groups had significantly different views on criminal justice
policy and on race. Compared to those who seldom watched
television news, those who reported watching the news daily were
“16 percent more likely to support punitive remedies and endorse
the view that blacks are less intellectually able” than whites.246
Racial attitudes played an important role in support for punitive
policies. Daily news watchers who espoused “new racism”
attitudes247 were 28% more likely to support punitive criminal
justice policies than other residents of the same area.248 
By themselves, the survey results raise the issue of cause and
effect. One could easily hypothesize that people who hold punitive
views might have a much greater taste for local news. That
hypothesis, however, would not explain the finding in experimental
studies that exposure to news stories about crime increased support
for punitive policies. Together, the simulation studies and survey
research provide strong evidence that exposure to the typical
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249. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Valentino’s and Gilliam and Iyengar’s studies).
250. Gilliam and Iyengar furnished the viewing room casually, and allowed participants
to browse books and magazines, snack, and chat with other participants. Gilliam & Iyengar,
supra note 233, at 564. Valentino decorated the site for the study to look “as much as possible
like ... a typical living room.” Valentino, supra note 213, at 301.
episodic crime script employed on television can increase support
for punitive crime policies.
Although the research described above supports the view that the
way the news frames crime stories encourages punitive attitudes,
more experimental and survey work will be required to establish
this point. The leading priming and framing studies that focus on
crime news249 were conducted in California shortly after the Rodney
King and O.J. Simpson trials galvanized the public, focusing
attention on race, crime, and the link between them. Perhaps
experimental studies conducted elsewhere would have yielded
different results; or perhaps using a candidate other than Bill
Clinton might have made a difference. Moreover, even assuming
that the findings can be replicated, a gap would still exist between
what can be measured in an experimental setting and what occurs
in real life. For example, despite the researchers’ efforts to simulate
a realistic setting,250 participants in these studies may nonetheless
have been more attentive than viewers at home, who frequently
watch television while cooking or engaging in other activities.
Additional survey work may help to measure the impact of news
consumption. Finally, the framing studies should be supplemented
with research that focuses on particular aspects of the news media’s
impact on viewers. Two aspects, the media’s creation of fear and its
reinforcement of racial typification, are discussed in the following
subsections.
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251. For a definition of the term fear, see Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 985 (2004) (giving
philosophic definition as “a package of belief, desire, physical arousal, and unpleasant affect”
and distinguishing anxiety, which has a more indefinite object or one the subject cannot flee
(footnote omitted)). Adler argues that environmental, health, and safety regulators should
seek to quantify and monetize the fear states that would result for regulatory choices and
include them in cost-benefit analyses. Id. at 986-89. Extending this analysis, one could argue
that a diminution of fear of crime is itself a good that could be quantified and included in a
cost-benefit analysis of criminal justice policies.
252. Mira Sotirovic, Affective and Cognitive Processes as Mediators of Media Influences on
Crime-Policy Preferences, 4 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 311, 324 (2001); see also RAY SURETTE,
MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES 207 (2d ed. 1998) (“Fear-of-
crime levels are socially important because they influence support for punitive criminal
justice policies and encourage social isolation.”); cf. Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of
Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and Their Symbolic Expression in Condemning and
Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 929, 930-31 (2003) (discussing the psychology of condemnation
and suggesting that fear serves as a motivator of condemnation for criminals).
253. See, e.g., Robert H. Langworthy & John T. Whitehead, Liberalism and Fear as
Explanations of Punitiveness, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1986) (exploring the relationship
between liberalism, victimization experience, fear of victimization, and attitudes towards
purposes of incarceration); Richard C. McCorkle, Research Note, Punish and Rehabilitate?
Public Attitudes Toward Six Common Crimes, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 240 (1993) (examining
how support for goals of treatment and assistance varies across six common crimes); J.L.
Miller et al., Perceptions of Justice: Race and Gender Differences in Judgments of Appropriate
Prison Sentences, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313 (1986) (finding subjective proximity to crime has
stronger implications than objective proximity for judgments of punishment); Ira M.
Schwartz et al., Public Attitudes Toward Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice: Implications
for Public Policy, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 241, 241 (1992) (finding significant
relationships between fear of victimization by violent crime and support for punitive policies).
A helpful review of the literature is contained in Ted Chiricos et al., Racial Typification of
Crime and Support for Punitive Measures, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 359, 364-68 (2004).
254. See, e.g., Philip E. Secret & James B. Johnson, Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward
b. Fear251
A theory often proposed by both criminologists and media
scholars posits that the media’s focus on violent crime produces an
affective reaction in viewers: fear of crime. According to this theory,
fearful individuals opt for immediate and extreme solutions to the
crime problem, causing their policy preferences to become punitive
rather than preventative.252 The evidence concerning the relation-
ship between fear of crime and support for punitive policies is
inconsistent. Although some studies have found such a
relationship,253 other studies have found that fear of crime is not a
significant factor in predicting support for punitive policies when
other variables are controlled.254 If there is a relationship between
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Crime Control, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 361, 361-64 (1989); Jane B. Sprott, Are Members of the
Public Tough on Crime?: The Dimensions of Public “Punitiveness,” 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 467, 467-
68 (1999).
255. See, e.g., Michael Hughes, The Fruits of Cultivation Analysis: A Reexamination of
Some Effects of Television Watching, 44 PUB. OPINION Q. 287, 287-88 (1980) (concluding that
gender and size of city of residence correlated more closely with fear than did television
watching); Jacob Wakshlag et al., Selecting Crime Drama and Apprehension About Crime,
10 HUM. COMM. RES. 227, 229 (1983) (finding greater support for a hypothesis of a selective
preference for crime viewing based upon prior anxieties).
256. See Ted Chiricos et al., Crime, News and Fear of Crime: Toward an Identification of
Audience Effects, 44 SOC. PROBS. 342 (1997) [hereinafter Chiricos et al., Toward an
Identification]  (employing a survey model to evaluate the effects of different factors on fear
levels); Ted Chiricos et al., Fear, TV News, and the Reality of Crime, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 755,
755-57 (2000) [hereinafter Chiricos et al., Fear] (studying the relationship between direct and
indirect experience with crime, and media-induced fear levels); Sarah Eschholz et al.,
Television and Fear of Crime: Program Types, Audience Traits, and the Mediating Effect of
Perceived Neighborhood Racial Composition, 50 SOC. PROBS. 395, 410 (2003) (using survey
data to study the differential effects of program types on fear and to determine how the racial
mix of individuals’ neighborhoods impacts the media-fear relationship).
257. See, e.g., George Gerbner & Larry Gross, Living with Television: The Violence Profile,
J. COMM., June 1976, at 193; George Gerbner & Larry Gross, The Scary World of TV’s Heavy
Viewer, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1976, at 89. The authors advanced a “cultivation hypothesis,”
which posited that heavy television watchers held distorted views about the prevalence of
crime. Id. For a recent Belgian study of entertainment programming that found support for
the cultivation hypothesis, see Jan Van den Bulck, Research Note, The Relationship Between
Television Fiction and Fear of Crime: An Empirical Comparison of Three Causal
Explanations, 19 EUR. J. COMM. 239, 247 (2004).
258. Eschholz et al., supra note 256, at 410-11; see also Sotirovic, supra note 252, at 321
(revealing that local news consumption is related to higher fear levels); Allen E. Liska &
William Baccaglini, Feeling Safe By Comparison: Crime in the Newspapers, 37 SOC. PROBS.
360, 366-67 (1990) (finding that newspaper stories about local homicides in the first fifteen
fear of crime and punitiveness, news may play an important role in
creating or enhancing that fear.
Although some scholars have suggested alternative expla-
nations,255 several recent studies have linked increased fear to
exposure to the news media.256 These studies buttress an earlier
hypothesis that linked the reiteration of violent episodes in the
media to the public’s exaggerated view of crime,257 and suggest that
high television viewing may actually be the cause of excessive fear.
For example, recent research found a positive correlation between
frequency of television watching and fear, though only for certain
program types. These studies found fear levels were heightened
among viewers who watched more local news, reality, and tabloid
programs, though consumption of national news and news maga-
zine were not related to fear.258 The researchers attributed this
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pages of newspaper were positively correlated with increased fear of crime, but coverage of
nonlocal crimes was negatively correlated, which they hypothesized might indicate that
readers felt “safe by comparison”); Daniel Romer et al., Television News and the Cultivation
of Fear of Crime, 53 J. COMM. 88 (2003) (finding support for the cultivation theory from data
showing that viewing local television news—but not national news or local newspapers—was
related to heightened perceptions of crime risk). But see Kimberly Gross & Sean Aday, The
Scary World in Your Living Room and Neighborhood: Using Local Broadcast News,
Neighborhood Crime Rates, and Personal Experience To Test Agenda Setting and Cultivation,
53 J. COMM. 411 (2003) (finding that watching local news did not cultivate increased fear of
crime, although it did make viewers more likely to mention crime as an important problem
facing their community).
259. Eschholz et al., supra note 256, at 410.
260. Chiricos et al., Fear, supra note 256, at 772 (showing that the group most affected by
local television news is black women).
261. Id. at 775-76. However, for females, blacks, those with low incomes, and those in the
30-54 age group, local news induces fear regardless of the perceived reality of crime news.
Id.
262. Id. This finding contradicts the earlier belief that media effects are stronger when an
individual lacks experience with an issue. See SURETTE, supra note 252, at 205.
263. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
result to both the low rates of violence depicted in national news
and the low level of proximate relevance in national stories.259
The media’s ability to instill fear in viewers varies from person
to person. For example, one researcher found that local news
consumption impacts the fear levels of women and blacks much
more than it impacts the levels of men and whites.260 Other factors
may also influence the link between fear and the media. Measuring
the effects of the “reality of crime,” researchers discovered that local
news consumption has a statistically significant relationship to fear
for individuals who live in high-crime areas, for viewers with recent
victim experience, and for those who view local news as realistically
portraying crime.261 These findings suggest that local news
consumption raises fear levels regardless of direct experience with
crime.262 In contrast, agenda setting generally has its greatest
impact on issues of which the reader or viewer has little personal
knowledge.263 
The relationship between television watching, fear of crime, and
increased support for punitive policies appears to be affected by
residential patterns and race. For both blacks and whites who
perceive themselves to live in neighborhoods with a high percentage
of blacks, fear of crime increases when television watching in-
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264. Eschholz et al., supra note 256, at 409.
265. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et al., Where You Live and What You Watch? The Impact of
Racial Proximity and Local Television News on Attitudes About Race and Crime, 55 POL. RES.
Q. 755, 769-70 (2002). To study the interaction between neighborhood context and racially
stereotypic news, the authors collected data about the racial mix of the respondents’
neighborhoods and then exposed the subjects either to racially stereotypic or nonstereotypic
crime stories on local news programs. Id.
266. Id. at 760.
267. Id.
268. The concept of moral panics was developed by British criminologists. See generally
ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
DEVIANCE (1994); PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA (1998); TONRY, supra note 1, at 85-96. The classic definition
of a moral panic refers to a situation in which
[a] condition, episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined
as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized
and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned
creases.264 But in the case of racially mixed neighborhoods, fear may
not translate into support for punitive policies. One recent experi-
mental simulation concluded that, when exposed to racially
stereotypic news coverage, white subjects who lived in homogenous
neighborhoods supported more punitive policies, whereas whites
who lived in heterogenous neighborhoods were either unaffected by
the coverage or endorsed less punitive policies.265 The authors
reasoned that racially isolated whites, who have less direct
experience with minorities, are more vulnerable to the media’s
influence.266 In contrast, whites who lived in more racially mixed
neighborhoods were less likely to be affected by media stereotypes
that conflict with their personal experiences.267 The media’s ability
to promote racial stereotypes relates to racial typification, which is
explored in the next subsection. 
The news media’s role in inducing fear has also been noted in
scholarship describing the development and effect of social panics
that have led to the adoption of punitive criminal legislation. These
accounts of the social construction of crime provide a related and
largely consistent explanation for the relationship among the news
media’s treatment of crime, the promotion of fear of crime, and
public support for punitive policies. The term moral panic refers to
periodic episodes of sharply increased public anxiety about the
threat some group or condition poses to society’s values and well
being.268 Moral panics are characterized by exaggerated perceptions
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by editors, bishops, politicians, and other right-thinking people; socially
accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions .... 
STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS
1 (3d ed. 2002); see also Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophila, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 345, 359 (2003) (quoting Stanley Cohen’s definition of moral panic).
269. See Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1535, 1583 n.218 (2004) (noting, describing, and providing scholarly sources for three
competing models: (1) the “grassroots model” of panics triggered by a groundswell of public
concern, (2) the “interest model” in which interest groups commandeer incidents to promote
themselves and their agendas, and (3) the “elite-engineered” model in which a triggering
mechanism starts from politicians and other political elites).
270. See JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND NEW
VICTIMS 1-2, 29-30, 32-35, 37-47, 63-64 (1999) (noting the traditional role of news media in
fostering moral panics and describing the role played by news media—as well as activists,
experts, and government officials—in the development of the concept of “random violence,”
including “wilding,” “road rage,” and gang crime). However, several scholars have noted that
not every high profile crime creates a moral panic; they occur only when other social
conditions provide receptive soil. See Filler, supra note 269, at 363; Joseph E. Kennedy,
Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 829, 877-82 (2000) (emphasizing that neither media emphasis nor efforts by
activist groups and politicians–“claimsmakers”–are uniformly successful in creating moral
panics; success depends upon the receptivity of the audience, which varies over time). Thus
the media’s role may be significant, but it is not, by itself, sufficient.
271. See, e.g., Filler, supra note 269, at 360-63 (describing legislation enacted as a result
of moral panic about sexual predators following the abduction and murder of Megan Kanka
by a previously convicted sex offender). For a discussion of moral panics over so called “new
crimes” such as road rage, drive-by shootings, and various gang crimes, see BEST, supra note
270, at 28-47. For a discussion of moral panic and the post-Enron efforts to respond to
accounting fraud and other white collar offenses, see José Gabilondo, Financial Moral Panic!
Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements, 36 SETON HALL
L. REV. 781 (2006).
272. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 6 (2005).
For a cultural cognition critique of Sunstein, see Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:
A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006).
of the prevalence and importance of a phenomenon or group.
Although scholars do not agree on the triggering mechanism for
moral panics,269 the media’s sensationalized treatment often plays
a central role in their development and spread.270 Moral panics have
often focused on criminal activity and led to the rapid passage of
harsh legislation to deal with the perceived crisis.271 During the
1990s, moral panics about child abductions and sexual predators
galvanized state and federal lawmakers. Cass Sunstein provides a
related account of risk panics.272 Beginning with an account of
various defects in human risk perception, he argues that these
defects are greatly amplified by the social forces of availability
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273. SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 6.
274. Id. at 98.
275. See Ted Chiricos & Sarah Eschholz, The Racial and Ethnic Typification of Crime and
the Criminal Typification of Race and Ethnicity in Local Television News, 39 J. RES. CRIME
& DELINQ. 400, 402 (2002).
276. See DANILO YANICH, CTR. FOR CMTY. DEV. & FAMILY POL’Y, KIDS, CRIME & LOCAL TV
NEWS 17, 42 (1999), available at http://www.localtvnews.org/papers/KidsCrime&Local
TVNews.pdf  (finding that, in Baltimore and Philadelphia, 51% of local news stories about
juvenile offenders and 42% of stories about adult offenders involved murder even though
murder represented only 0.3% of juvenile arrests and 0.9% of adult arrests); LORI DORFMAN
& VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME
IN THE NEWS 17 (2001), http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.pdf (studying
sixteen social science articles examining media portrayals of juveniles and finding a
consensus among them that news coverage of youth often involves violence).
277. See MARK SOLER, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, PUBLIC OPINION ON YOUTH, CRIME
AND RACE: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 5 (2001), http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/
advocacyguide.pdf (pointing out that, despite a 68% decline in juvenile homicide between
1993 and 1999, 62% of poll respondents in 1999 thought juvenile crime was increasing);
YANICH, supra note 276, at 25 (citing Ted Chiricos, Fear of Crime and Related Perceptions:
A Statewide Survey of Florida 1996 (1997), http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/TA/fear/ (showing
that about 90% of Florida adults across all age groups viewed teenagers as more violent than
adults and as more apathetic toward the consequences of their behavior, and that 64% of
young adults and 76% of seniors said teen criminals were “like predators”)).
278. Vincent Schiraldi, Op-Ed., Juvenile Crime Is Decreasing—It’s Media Coverage That’s
cascades and group polarization.273 Sunstein notes that such
availability cascades—which result when fear inducing accounts
with high emotional valence are repeated—lead to cascade effects
that help explain moral panics about subjects such as drug crimes
and teenage gangs.274
c. Racial Typification
Other scholars in the disciplines of media studies and criminol-
ogy have identified racial typification as a cause of increased
punitiveness. Racial typification refers to the media’s stereotypical
portrayal of crime as a minority phenomenon.275 Initial studies of
media coverage found skewed crime content portraying some
groups, such as juveniles and minorities, as more criminally
dangerous than others. For example, researchers have found that
media coverage exaggerates the prevalence of juvenile crime,276
provoking increased fear of youth “predators.”277 Although juveniles
were arrested for only about 9% of homicides in 1999, in one survey
the public estimated this figure to be 43%.278 
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Soaring, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, at B7.
279. ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 78-106 (2000). Entman and Rojecki examined Chicago local
television news broadcasts for a ten-week period during 1993-1994. Id.
280. Id. at 81 (discovering an overrepresentation of white victims compared to black
victims at a ratio of 1.5:1, even though blacks are more likely to be victimized).
281. Id.
282. Chiricos & Eschholz, supra note 275, at 414 (studying television news in Orlando
during 1998 and finding that “the ratios of suspect/victim (4.0), suspect/police (0.6), and
suspect/role model (1.1) were between three and more than five times higher [for Blacks]
than the same ratios for Whites”); Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Overrepresentation and
Underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos as Lawbreakers on Television News,
50 J. COMM. 131 (2000) (finding black defendants were overrepresented and Latinos
underrepresented as criminal defendants on Los Angeles and Orange County television news
compared to crime reports); Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Race and the Misrepresentation
of Victimization on Local Television News, 27 COMM. RES. 547 (2000) (finding blacks
overrepresented as defendants and whites overrepresented as victims); cf. Travis L. Dixon
& Daniel Linz, Television News, Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity, and the Depiction of Race, 46
J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 112 (2002) (finding blacks and Latinos to be twice as
likely as whites to be associated with prejudicial pretrial statements on Los Angeles
television news, and Latinos who victimized whites to be three times as likely as white
defendants to be associated with prejudicial pretrial statements). One study, however, found
that in network news whites were overrepresented and blacks underrepresented as victims
and police officers, but whites were more likely to appear as perpetrators. Travis L. Dixon
et al., The Portrayal of Race and Crime on Television Network News, 47 J. BROADCASTING &
ELECTRONIC MEDIA 498 (2003).
283. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 279, at 82 (finding that, of the ten mug shots
displayed during the ten-week study, eight were of black offenders); Chiricos & Eschholz,
supra note 275, at 411 (finding that Orlando news displayed the mug shots of black offenders
almost twice as often as they displayed the mug shots of white offenders).
284. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 279, at 83 (finding that 38% of blacks were depicted
Other research found that distorted crime coverage along racial
lines causes viewers to link the threat of crime to minorities. A
study of Chicago local television news broadcasts279 revealed an
overrepresentation of white victims as opposed to black victims, as
well as a discrepancy in the amount of screen time the average
story devoted to victims of different races (185 seconds for white
victims compared to 106 seconds for black victims).280 This resulted
in a 3:1 disparity in total time devoted to white as opposed to black
victims.281 Similar studies have confirmed that minorities appear
more frequently on the news as criminal suspects than they do as
crime victims, police officers, or role models.282 Evidence also
suggests that local news disproportionately portrays minorities in
menacing contexts, with blacks more likely than whites to be shown
in mug shots,283 in the physical custody of law enforcement,284 and
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in police custody, compared to only 15% of whites). But see Chiricos & Eschholz, supra note
275, at 411 (revealing that in their study 47% of whites were shown in the physical custody
of law enforcement compared to only 38% of blacks).
285. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 279, at 83 (finding that blacks were shown in prison
or street clothing 54% of the time, whereas whites were shown in the same way only 31% of
the time). In this context, street clothing seems to refer to the type of clothing that might
signal gang membership or otherwise evoke fear, rather than a more neutral typical use of
the term street clothes.
286. Chiricos & Eschholz, supra note 275, at 412. Blacks were shown one-third of the time
and Hispanics were shown 100% of the time as victimizing members of different races,
though whites were never shown this way. Id.
287. Id.; see also DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 276, at 4 (indicating that Americans
believe they have a much higher chance to be victimized by minorities than whites when, in
actuality, they are three times more likely to be victimized by whites). 
288. Chiricos et al., Toward an Identification, supra note 256, at 376.
289. See PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES
AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 197-99 (1997) (finding that respondents who said they would
prefer fewer civil rights for minorities were more punitive toward all crimes and were more
supportive of the death penalty). Other researchers have found more limited connections
between racial attitudes and punitiveness. One researcher who used measures of racial
antipathy and racial stereotyping found that both were significantly related to punitiveness
for “nonsouthern” respondents, but not for her full national sample or for her “southern”
respondents. Marian J. Borg, The Southern Subculture of Punitiveness? Regional Variation
in Support for Capital Punishment, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 25, 41 (1997). A study of the
attitudes of juvenile court personnel found that a belief in racial differences was correlated
with support for the death penalty being applied to juveniles, but not with other punitive
policies for juvenile offenders. See generally Michael J. Leiber & Anne C. Woodrick, Religious
Beliefs, Attributional Styles, and Adherence to Correctional Orientations, 24 CRIM. JUST. &
in street or prison clothing.285 Additionally, minorities are shown
more often victimizing strangers and members of different races or
ethnicities.286 These findings have led some scholars to conclude
that unequal media representations cause the public to exaggerate
the number of blacks arrested for crimes, overestimate the likeli-
hood that they will be victimized by minorities, and attribute the
crime problem to blacks as a group.287
Some evidence suggests a positive correlation between racial
typification of crime and punitive attitudes, which suggests that
skewed crime coverage may contribute to increased punitiveness.
Researchers who surveyed attitudes about punishment and
black involvement in crime found that white individuals who
associated crime with blacks held more punitive attitudes.288 This
finding is broadly consistent with earlier studies finding
negative perceptions of blacks and minorities to be related to var-
ious punitive attitudes.289 However, the perception that crime is
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BEHAV. 495 (1997).
290. See Chiricos et al., Toward an Identification, supra note 256, at 374-76 (reasoning
that, for other individuals, crime salience is so high already that racial stereotypes cannot
push punitive attitudes much further—what the authors refer to as the “‘ceiling effect’”); id.
at 372 (defining “concern”). The study involved a national survey of 885 households that used
punitive attitudes toward crime as the dependent variable. The authors controlled for factors
that already predict punitiveness, including the belief that crime is disproportionately
violent, political conservatism, and southern residence. Id. at 369-70. 
291. Id. at 377.
292. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1553-54 (2005).
293. Kang defines “racial schema” as “racial categories, racial mapping rules, and racial
meanings.” Id. at 1499-501.
294. Id. at 1554.
disproportionately committed by blacks correlated with
punitiveness only for whites who rated relatively low on the
measure of concern for crime—which the researchers defined as a
cognitive expression of the crime issue’s importance, not an
affective measure of fear.290 This finding raises interesting ques-
tions about the relationship between different factors associated
with punitiveness, such as holding conservative attitudes and living
in the South. Some scholars have suggested that racial typification
of crime can substitute for heightened crime salience caused by
other factors—such as conservatism and southern residence—
provoking similar punitive attitudes.291 At some point, however,
punitiveness reaches a high enough level that media exposure and
racial stereotypes produce no increase. On the other hand, viewers
who are not already concerned with crime may develop more
punitive attitudes when they see distorted crime coverage. 
Jerry Kang has argued that local news programming is so “dense
with images of racial minorities committing violent crimes,” and so
damaging in its effects, that it should be analogized to a Trojan
Horse computer virus.292 Like a virus that secretly attaches itself to
a program, later corrupting files or e-mailing spam, local news
projects images that alter our racial schema293 and are far more
powerful than words.294 This effect is especially insidious because
viewers are unaware that it is occurring.
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295. See supra Part IV.B.
296. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
297. In a survey assessing support for California’s harsh three-strikes initiative and
general punitiveness, researchers found that individuals’ concerns with social values and
their judgments about social conditions were the most influential factors. See Tom R. Tyler
& Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why? The Psychology of Public
Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (1997); cf. GARLAND, supra
note 1, at 77-78 (emphasizing the role social changes in late modernism had on U.S. support
for harsh criminal justice policies).
298. Nielsen Media Research, More About the Ethnic Television Audience, http://www.
nielsenmedia.com/ethnicmeasure/moreethnicaudience.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
299. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, supra note 169. Thirty-seven
percent of blacks, 32% of Hispanics, and 47% of whites read newspapers daily. Fifty-nine
percent of blacks, 56% of Hispanics, and 56% of whites watch television news broadcasts
daily. Id.
3. Different Groups, Different Media, and Different Settings
As mentioned above,295 individuals may respond to the news
media’s portrayal of crime in different ways, depending on factors
such as demographics, political attitudes, and victim experience.
For example, news broadcasts about crime appear to have relatively
little effect on the attitudes of viewers who already have a high
level of concern about crime and highly punitive attitudes. This
phenomenon, referred to as the “ceiling effect,” has been observed
in research that explored the link between punitive views and
conservative attitudes, southern residence, and the belief that crime
is very violent.296 Research about the sources of punitive attitudes
and fear of crime has identified other factors linked to punitiveness,
including perceptions about diversity and disorder in the commu-
nity, and concerns with social values and their judgments about
social conditions.297 Whether the same kind of ceiling effect may
exist when individuals who rate high on these predictors for
punitive attitudes are exposed to crime coverage in the news media
remains to be seen.
The media’s ability to influence news consumers may also depend
on media choice and exposure, which differs among individuals and
demographic groups. For example, blacks watch more television
than any other segment of the population across all age groups,298
and both blacks and Hispanics prefer to get their news from
television.299 In contrast, whites are more likely to get their news
from a variety of sources, including newspapers, television, and the
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300. See id.
301. Id.
302. DORIS A. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 202 (6th ed. 2002).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. In addition to the studies cited infra note 317, see Adrian Furnham & Barrie Gunter,
Effects of Time of Day and Medium of Presentation on Immediate Recall of Violent and Non-
Violent News, 1 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 255, 255 (1987) (finding that print is the most
effective medium in producing cued recall); and John P. Robinson & Dennis K. Davis,
Television News and the Informed Public: An Information-Processing Approach, 40 J. COMM.
106, 116 (1990) (finding that participants who reported reading newspapers had higher levels
of news information than those who reported watching television news). But see Robert H.
Wicks, Remembering the News: Effects of Medium and Message Discrepancy on News Recall
over Time, 72 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 666, 674 (1995) (finding no significant difference
between media in recall over time). Besides research on memory, however, different media
sources have not been shown to have different effects on public opinion. See GRABER, supra
note 302, at 197 (“[T]here is no evidence of consistent significant differences in the ability of
different media to persuade, inform, or even to instill an emotional response in audience
members.” (quoting W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 102 (1991)
(emphasis added))).
306. Sotirovic, supra note 252, at 324.
Internet.300 Age and education also influence media choice. Many
younger Americans have developed “news grazing” habits, which
means they check the news on a less regular basis than older
Americans. In fact, those aged sixty-five and older are about twice
as likely as those under age thirty to both read newspapers and
watch network nightly news on a daily basis.301 Finally, less-
educated people rely heavily on television and radio for news
content, whereas upper-income people use a variety of media
sources.302 As scholars have suggested, this discrepancy may arise
because print media sources cater to upper-income people and
ignore the concerns of low-income people,303 and because less-
educated people prefer entertaining news content that stirs the
emotions.304
Although little evidence of the differential media effects from
print and television sources exists,305 some scholars have posited a
connection between media use patterns and criminal policy
preferences. One study suggested that complex media content and
hard news promote analytical thinking, which leads news consum-
ers to prefer preventative policies over punitive policies.306 In
contrast, simple news content—such as local news, reality televi-
sion, and talk radio—was found to limit complex thinking and
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307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See John Gastil et al., The ‘Wildavsky Heuristic’: The Cultural Orientation of
Mass Political Opinion (Oct. 15, 2005) (Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 107), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=834264
(systematizing Wildavsky’s theory and presenting survey results finding that cultural
orientations account for policy-related attitudes on gun control, capital punishment, and
other issues). Kahan and his colleagues argue that cultural cognition plays an important role
in risk perception. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Essay, Cultural Cognition and Public
Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 155-60 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More
Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1291, 1294-95 (2003).
encourage affective responses.307 These findings suggest that the
media has a greater impact on the policy preferences of minorities,
younger people, and less-educated people, because they use fewer
and less complex media sources. Nonetheless, as the author of the
study admits, “[t]he presence of a relation between the media use
and complexity and fear does not necessarily imply a cause-and-
effect relation between them.”308 In other words, individuals with
more sophisticated thinking processes may self-select more complex
media sources, which would mean that media use patterns have
little independent influence on policy preferences. More research
will be needed to determine the actual impact of media use
patterns. 
New scholarship on cultural cognition suggests that there may be
other ways to understand how different individuals are affected by
news. Dan Kahan and his colleagues argue that an individual’s
cultural world view is a strong predictor of his attitudes toward
various criminal justice policies and his perceptions of risk.309 To
the extent that these world views shape and orient opinions
through cultural mechanisms, they may also shape the effects of
exposure to news about crime, interacting with or even overriding
other factors.
As the availability of different media channels increases, the
audience has more choices, and these choices also may impact the
media-punitiveness relationship. Because all-news cable stations
and the Internet are relatively new, there has been little research
on the impact of these media sources on public opinion. One recent
study does suggest that cable access produces greater political
polarization, because (1) cable viewers who are interested in politics
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310. Markus Prior, Avoiding Politics: The Relation of Entertainment Preference and
Partisan Feelings 17 (paper presented at annual meeting of American Political Science
Association, Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2001) (on file with the author).
311. Id.
312. News Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Americans Lack
Background To Follow International News: Public’s News Habits Little Changed by Sept. 11
(June 9, 2002) (on file with the author). In 2002, 36% of whites and 26% of blacks, 44% of
those between 18-29 and 9% of those 65 and older, and 57% of college graduates and 11% of
less than high school graduates went online for news. Id.
313. One study, described above, found that an agenda-setting effect persisted for one
week. See supra text accompanying note 208.
can watch more news, and (2) those more interested in entertain-
ment can easily avoid news.310 Because people who prefer entertain-
ment are less likely to vote, cable access may result in a larger
voting gap.311 Additional research is needed in the criminal justice
area to assess how cable access impacts punitive attitudes. For
example, will lower-income people who cannot afford cable experi-
ence different media effects?
The Internet also poses many interesting questions. A wide gap
already exists among Internet users, with whites, younger Ameri-
cans, and higher-income people accessing the Internet more often
for news than other groups.312 One important question is whether
the Internet will change the policy preferences of groups and
individuals. Also, will the fact that the Internet combines all three
traditional media sources into one—audio, visual, and print—have
any effect on news consumers?
4. What the Research Doesn’t Tell Us
As described in the preceding sections, the mechanisms that link
exposure to news media and punitive attitudes are not yet well
understood, and researchers have proposed competing theories.
Assuming that the mechanism or mechanisms are identified, many
fundamental questions will nonetheless remain. 
First, most of the experimental studies described above demon-
strate only that participants’ attitudes were influenced immediately
after exposure to the simulated broadcasts. In the real world, of
course, the question is whether any effects persist for days, weeks,
or months (or until the next election), and little work has been done
on this question.313 Common sense suggests that brief exposure to
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314. Dolf Zillmann & Su-lin Gan, Effects of Threatening Images in News Programs on the
Perception of Risk to Others and Self, 8 MEDIENPSYCHOLOGIE 288, 298-300 (1996).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41 (discussing Gilliam & Iyengar).
316. Another interesting question is the validity of the new racism index employed in the
Gilliam and Iyengar study, supra note 233, at 566 n.12, which treats attitudes such as
opposition to affirmative action as new racist attitudes. It seems questionable to label all
opposition to affirmative action as evidence of a new subtle form of racism. See Kang, supra
note 292, at 1507 (noting the risk of equating political conservatism with racism).
a news broadcast may soon be outweighed by other influences, but
one study found that the effect of a broadcast on the subjects’
perceptions was greater, rather than reduced, twelve to fourteen
days after exposure to a broadcast including compelling visual
images.314 If this research, which dealt with the risk of skin cancer,
could be replicated with crime news, it would simply open up new
questions. In the case of crime, unlike the risk of skin cancer, the
public is exposed to a continuing stream of news broadcasts;
information from other sources, including the personal experiences
of friends and relatives; and entertainment media, including
television drama, movies, and books. What long-term impact does
a single broadcast, or multiple broadcasts, have in a world with so
many other stimuli?
The last point is related to the most fundamental question: are
the news media responsible for the schema or scripts that are
triggered when television viewers see crime stories? As noted above,
when no suspect was shown, 60% of the participants in an experi-
mental setting incorrectly recalled that they had seen a suspect,
and in 70% of those cases they recalled seeing a black suspect.315
These studies present no evidence that the news media constitute
the original—or even the most important—source of the prejudices
and stereotypes that gave rise to such errors or influenced the
participants’ responses to the other portions of the studies. In
assessing the importance of the media’s role, one should consider
the impact of the other sources of the racist attitudes that viewing
crime news seems to prompt.316 Does the news play a significant
role in reinforcing, if not creating, these scripts; or is the media’s
influence outweighed by other factors, including personal experi-
ences at home, school, and work?
A host of critical questions also focus on the differential impact
of various media channels, and on different subgroups of the
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317. See, e.g., Melvin L. DeFleur et al., Audience Recall of News Stories Presented by
Newspaper, Computer, Television and Radio, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 1010 (1992) (finding recall
was higher for news stories presented by print or computer screen than stories presented by
television or radio); William P. Eveland, Jr. et al., Learning from the News in Campaign
2000: An Experimental Comparison of TV News, Newspapers, and Online News, 4 MEDIA
PSYCHOL. 355 (2002) (finding recall was more accurate for news stories presented by
newspaper and television, but that online news was better for producing more structured
knowledge); Barrie Gunter et al., Memory for the News as a Function of the Channel of
Communication, 3 HUM. LEARNING 265 (1984) (finding recall of content of news stories was
best from print and worst from audio-visual, and that “[v]iolent content was recalled better
overall than nonviolent content, and significantly so in the audio-only and print modes”);
Matthew Koehler et al., What Is Video Good For? Examining How Media and Story Genre
Interact, 14 J. EDUC. MULTIMEDIA & HYPERMEDIA 249 (2005) (finding no difference between
video and text on measures of immediate recall, but suggesting that video presentations may
enhance viewers’ perceptions of the quality of the information); David Tewksbury & Scott L.
Althaus, Differences in Knowledge Acquisition Among Readers of the Paper and Online
Versions of a National Newspaper, 77 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 457 (2000) (finding that
online readers had lower levels of recall and recognition than those who read the print
version); Juliette H. Walma van der Molen & Tom H. A. Van Der Voort, The Impact of
Television, Print, and Audio on Children’s Recall of the News: A Study of Three Alternative
Explanations for the Dual-Coding Hypothesis, 26 HUM. COMM. RES. 3, 20-24 (2000) (finding
that both adults and children learned more from television news stories presented in a
children’s news format, and suggesting that correspondence between verbal and visual
content of television stories is decisive for effectiveness of television and print); Juliette H.
Walma van der Molen & Marlies E. Klijn, Recall of Television Versus Print News: Retesting
the Semantic Overlap Hypothesis, 48 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 89 (2004)
(finding that when there is a good match between verbal and visual information, television
presentations produce superior recall over print, but when the verbal and visual information
do not match, print presentations produce better recall); supra note 305.
318. See, e.g., Annie Lang et al., Negative Video as Structure: Emotion, Attention,
Capacity, and Memory, 40 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 460 (1996) (finding the
presence of negative video in news stories increases attention, ability to retrieve the story,
and recognition of information presented during the negative video, but decreases the ability
to recall information presented before the negative video).
319. See, e.g., Claudette Guzan Artwick, Blood, Body Bags, & Tears: Remembering Visual
Images from Local Television Crime News, VISUAL COMM. Q., Spring 1996, at 14, 14-17
(analyzing which images were perceived to be the most compelling, and which were most
frequently recalled; and finding that the image of a murder victim’s mother, though not as
compelling as the image of a body bag on a stretcher, was recalled more frequently).
320. Johannes W. J. Beentjes & Tom H. A. van der Voort, Television Viewing Versus
Reading: Mental Effort, Retention, and Inferential Learning, 42 COMM. EDUC. 191 (1993)
audience. Researchers have probed the impact of different media
on recall of factual information,317 and have examined the effect
of different kinds of images, such as graphic images, negative
images,318 and facial images.319 Not surprisingly, this research
is beginning to reveal a complex picture. Print may be more
effective than video for some audiences, but not for others.320 The
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(finding that children recalled print and television stories equally well on immediate recall
measures, but television viewers scored higher on inferential learning and delayed recall
tests); Ann N. Crigler et al., Interpreting Visual Versus Audio Messages in Television News,
44 J. COMM. 132, 134 (1994) (describing earlier studies finding video more effective for
audience members with low cognitive skills, and print more effective for those with high
cognitive skills); Barrie Gunter et al., Children’s Memory for News: A Comparison of Three
Presentation Media, 2 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 93 (2000) (finding children’s news recall was better
from television than from either print or audio presentations).
321. Crigler et. al., supra note 320, at 134.
322. Id. (finding audio alone to be just as effective as combined audio and video
presentations for conveying information, but finding subjects were most emotionally aroused
by the combined presentation).
323. The effect may also vary depending on the style of presentation. Although tabloid-
style reporting draws in more viewers, the viewers generally see it as less reliable than
traditional reporting styles. See Maria Elizabeth Grabe et al., Packaging Television News:
The Effects of Tabloid on Information Processing and Evaluative Responses, 44 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 581 (2000). As noted above, framing a story in terms
of human interest may also diminish recollection by drawing viewers away from the facts.
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
effectiveness of different media channels seems to vary depending
on the story’s subject matter.321 A channel that is effective in
conveying information may not be equally effective at creating an
affective impact.322 To fully understand the effect of crime news, a
more detailed analysis that considers these and other factors is
necessary.323
C. It’s Not All the Media
In focusing on the news media’s role in promoting public support
for punitive criminal justice policy, I do not mean to imply that
other forces are not at work as well. To the contrary, the news
clearly is but one piece of the puzzle, albeit, I argue, an important
one. Other factors clearly play a role in promoting punitive public
attitudes and the adoption and maintenance of harsh criminal
justice policies in the United States. American culture and the
American political system do differ in some respects from their
European counterparts, and those differences seem to play a
significant role in promoting punitive policies. Although they are
independent factors, our culture and political system also interact
with the news media, with each potentially reinforcing the other to
increase support for punitive policies.
2006] THE NEWS MEDIA’S INFLUENCE 469
324. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, A Nation Challenged: Legal Procedure—Paris Fights Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at B5 (discussing European Union countries’ traditional
refusal to extradite defendants potentially facing the death penalty); Steven Erlanger,
German Chancellor Hopes To Release Evidence Soon, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at A26
(discussing the refusal of Germany, and other European nations, to release evidence that
could be used for securing the death penalty against an extradited defendant, such as
twentieth hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui, and mentioning those nations’ traditional refusal to
extradite defendants facing the death penalty). 
325. For a general discussion of American exceptionalism, see IS AMERICA DIFFERENT? A
NEW LOOK AT AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991); JOHN W. KINGDON,
AMERICA THE UNUSUAL (1999); DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1998).
326. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 116-17 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that American political
culture is rooted in values of self-reliance and individualism); GARLAND, supra note 1, at 15
(describing the shift of criminological thought in the 1970s toward a greater emphasis on self-
control and social control). Not all Americans place an equal weight on individualistic values.
One of the two dimensions of the cultural cognition model proposed by Kahan and his
colleagues is individualistic versus solidaristic orientation. See Kahan & Braman, supra note
309 passim.
327. See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
1. American Culture
As several recent events have made clear, American culture is
significantly different from the culture of the European Union.
These differences have been highlighted by recent events, such as
the European resistance to the invasion of Iraq, and the reluctance
of several European countries to cooperate in the prosecution of
suspected terrorists because they could be subject to capital
punishment in the United States.324 Scholars from many different
fields have probed the exceptionalism of American culture.325 A
general assessment of American culture is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is possible to identify several distinctive facets that
likely bear on punitiveness. 
 A number of characteristic features of American culture may
support punitive attitudes. The traditional American emphasis on
the values of individualism, self-reliance, and personal responsibil-
ity326 is consistent with an understanding of crime as an individual
choice rather than the result of socioeconomic conditions. From
here, it can be a short step to the conclusion that society should
punish crime more harshly to deter it, while at the same time
emphasizing personal responsibility rather than the excessive
lenience of liberal programs such as welfare.327 These attitudes
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AMERICAN POLITICS 48-52 (1997). For a general discussion of Americans’ attitudes toward the
welfare state, see MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999).
328. Frank Zimring has correlated the historical use of lynching and other aspects of
vigilante justice in specific regions to support for capital punishment. He theorizes that the
vigilante tradition of regarding the punishment of criminals as a matter of local concern
neutralizes one key argument against capital punishment—fear of government power—and
creates a receptive climate for the argument that the relatives of victims deserve capital
punishment to bring them closure. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS
OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2003) (attempting to explain “the contradictions in
American culture that generate conflict over the death penalty”).
329. See RONALD INGLEHART ET AL., HUMAN VALUES AND BELIEFS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
SOURCEBOOK tbl.V9 (1998).
330. In 2005, 68% of those in the South favored the death penalty for persons convicted
of murder, compared to 65% in the West, 64% in the Midwest, and 59% in the East. 2003
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at tbl.2.52.2005, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t2522005.pdf. Frank Zimring sees less difference in support for the death penalty in different
regions than in its enforcement. See ZIMRING, supra note 46, at 11-12 (stating that “[p]ublic
support for the death penalty is spread fairly evenly across regions,” but the level of
executions varies by more than 100 to 1).
331. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in
South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 332-33 (2003).
332. Tyler & Boeckmann, supra note 297, at 237; see also Jodi Lane & James W. Meeker,
Subcultural Diversity and the Fear of Crime and Gangs, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 497, 497-98
(2000) (finding fear about “subcultural diversity” to be a strong predictor of both fear of crime
clearly distinguish the United States from the welfare states of the
European Union. There may also be lingering consequences of the
frontier vigilante tradition, particularly in the American South and
West, where support for punitive measures is typically the
highest.328 Another aspect of American culture that stands in
contrast to our European counterparts is our greater emphasis on
religion.329 Support for punitive policies such as the death penalty
is highest in the Bible Belt,330 where religious belief and observance
are the strongest. Research on the death penalty also suggests that
certain groups, such as Southern Baptists, support the death
penalty more strongly than other groups.331
America’s heterogenous melting-pot society may also predispose
us to support punitive crime measures. A study of supporters of
California’s three-strikes law found that the most significant factors
correlating with support for these measures were not directly
related to crime, but rather were general concerns about diversity
in society and the breakdown of morality and discipline in the
family and in society in general.332 
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and fear of gangs).
333. See supra Part IV.B.2.
334. BECKETT, supra note 327, at 16-27.
335. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 530 (2001).
336. See, e.g., id. at 531-32 (relating the importance of legislators “taking popular symbolic
stands” to please voters).
337. For a discussion of interest group theory in the context of federal criminal legislation,
see Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for
Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1248-53 (2000).
338. Ronald Wright has noted that, for purposes of public choice analysis, criminal justice
Finally, crime and violence are staples of the American entertain-
ment media. The entertainment industry’s emphasis on crime,
though not unique to the United States, may reinforce the impact
of the news media on public opinion. Entertainment media may
reinforce the news media’s agenda-setting effects, though this effect
may be offset to a degree by the recognition of the programming’s
fictional quality. Perhaps more important, the entertainment media
generally portray individual crimes in a manner that reinforces the
assumption that crime arises from individual decisions, rather than
societal causes. As noted above, this framing may lead to support
for punitive policies.333 
2. American Politics
There is also an important political aspect to the story of public
concern about crime and support for punitive policies. Various
theories have been proposed regarding the politics of crime control
in the United States. Katherine Beckett has highlighted the role of
political initiatives and shown that during key periods political
initiatives and media coverage preceded heightened levels of public
concern about crime.334 Tougher criminal sentences are especially
effective as political initiatives because they are easier for the
public to grasp than changes in criminal law doctrines,335 particu-
larly when they are associated with a catchy phrase like “three
strikes.” Supporting punitive policies also provides the public with
a way to express moral outrage against crime.336 Moreover, longer
sentences are popular with several key interest groups,337 and
public choice theory predicts that such groups will prevail in the
legislative process.338 During the 1990s, well-funded private interest
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legislation falls into several different categories. Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for
Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 255-60 (2004).
In the case of changes-in-punishment statutes, prosecutors, and in some cases victims’
groups, are recognized in addition to the organized interest groups who normally prevail in
the legislative process. See id. at 258. Legislation faces little resistance even though it will
impose large costs on the public at large, because those costs will be diffuse, not immediate,
and difficult to trace. See id. However, as Wright notes, new procedures may help
legislatures make the budgetary connections between costs and benefits, increasing
legislative restraint. Id. at 258-59. For further discussion of the effect of budgetary
constraints as a limiting factor, see infra notes 339-44 and accompanying text.
339. For example, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) played
a major role in the adoption of the state’s three-strikes law and in the election of its recent
governors who strongly supported longer prison sentences and the construction of more
prisons. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 436 n.242 (1997) (describing CCPOA as the second-largest campaign
donor in California and stating that CCPOA donated the second largest amount in support
of the three-strikes initiative, Proposition 184). The CCPOA reportedly donated $1.5 million
to the campaign of Governor Pete Wilson, who strongly supported both three strikes and
prison construction, and spent $2.3 million to elect Governor Gray Davis. Developments in
the Law III. A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1873 nn.33 & 34 (2002); see also Vitiello, supra, at 481 n.242 (noting that
as governor “Wilson launched the most expensive prison construction plan that any state has
ever undertaken”). Prison guards in California are well paid: in 1997 the average starting
salary of a guard with a high school diploma and six years experience was nearly $2,000
more than an associate professor with a Ph.D. starting at the University of California. Walter
L. Gordon III, California’s Three Strikes Law: Tyranny of the Majority, 20 WHITTIER L. REV.
577, 608 (1999) (citing CAL. DEP’T OF CORR., CDC FACTS, 1 (1997)). For a general argument
that “the prison-industrial complex” has become a powerful lobbying group, see THE REAL
WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION (Steven R.
Donziger ed., 1996); Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
1998, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/98dec/prisons.html.
340. In the United States these groups have generally supported harsher penalties rather
than other initiatives, such as financial support and services for crime victims. Although
multiple reasons for this policy preference may exist, some groups have a significant
financial stake in the current punitive policies as well as strong ties to other groups with a
direct financial stake. See Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative
Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 430 (noting that some victims’ rights
groups are financed by criminal fines and forfeitures, and that the state prison guards’ union
provided 78% of funding for leading California victims’ rights group).
341. See id. at 534.
groups representing the prison industry played a substantial role
in supporting the adoption of some punitive policies and the election
of officials who support such policies.339 Victims’ rights advocacy
groups have also been key players supporting the current tough on
crime policies.340 In the context of criminal justice legislation, law
enforcement officials function as an important interest group.341
Prosecutors consistently favor laws that make it easier to get
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342. See Stuntz, supra note 335, at 529.
343. See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641,
1676-80 (2002) (describing how increased gun penalties have enhanced federal prosecutors’
leverage, resulting in higher conviction rates but surprisingly low numbers of cases in which
mandatory sentences were imposed).
344. For a general discussion of felony disenfranchisement, see THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), http://www.sentencing
project.org/pdfs/1046.pdf; CHRISTOPHER WAGGEN & JEFF MANZA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO STATE FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT LAW 1865-2003 (2003), http://
www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/UggenManzaSummary.pdf; Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Note,
Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109
(2003).
345. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 326, at 48-82; Beale, supra note 2, at 40-43.
Interestingly, William Stuntz suggests that a countervailing influence may also have
prevailed, and that crime was depoliticized during the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s and into
the 1970s because politicians did not want to be associated with segregationists. Stuntz,
supra note 335, at 584-85.
346. See generally 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at tbl.2.47, http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t247.pdf (comparing regional support from 1985 to 2002 for the statement
that local courts do not deal harshly enough with criminals); Borg, supra note 289
(comparing Southerners’ attitude toward capital punishment with a “southern subculture of
violence”).
convictions,342 and longer sentences can serve this function by
giving prosecutors increased leverage in plea negotiations.343 Few
if any countervailing interest groups exist. Indeed many of the
people most likely to be subjected to punitive measures, such as
three-strikes laws, have lost their civil rights, including the right to
vote.344 Some scholarship has emphasized the importance of the
opportunity for political realignment in the South following the
passage of national civil rights legislation, and the Republican
Party’s subsequent emphasis on crime issues.345 Southerners have
generally favored more severe sentences and more conservative
criminal justice policies,346 so the Republicans’ “get tough on crime”
campaigns played particularly well in the South. The general rise
in political conservatism in the United States may also have played
a role in increasing the support for punitive criminal justice
policies.
Some features of the American political system appear to make
it particularly receptive to punitive policy initiatives. In addition to
the cultural aspects noted above, certain structural features of the
American political system differ from those in most of our European
counterparts and may provide a partial explanation for the policy
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347. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 64, at 185-87 (comparing degree of popular control
over sentencing in the United States and other G-7 nations).
348. ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCARED: WHY AMERICA’S POLITICIANS CAMPAIGN TOO MUCH
AND GOVERN TOO LITTLE 44-46 (1997). That is not to say that European systems are immune
from the politics of crime. For an interesting discussion of the role French television news
regarding crime (l’insécurité) played in the presidential election of 2002, when National Front
Leader Jean-Marie Le Pen scored a noteworthy preliminary victory, see generally Raymond
Kuhn, ‘Be Very Afraid’: Television and l’Insécurité in the 2002 French Presidential Election,
20 EUR. J. COMM. 181 (2005). During the three-month run up to the election, l’insécurité was
the dominant theme on the major commercial French television channel, TF1, which ran
about twice as many stories as the state-run competitor, France 2. Id. at 183-85. Kuhn
concludes that although news coverage did provide support for Le Pen’s campaign themes,
television did not set the campaign agenda. Id. at 195. For a brief discussion of the impact
of talk radio, the tabloid press, and current affairs television programming on criminal
justice policy in Australia, see Nicholas Cowdery, The Impact of Media on Public Perception,
Political Action and Decision Making in the Justice System (2001), available at
http://isrcl.org/Papers/Cowdery.pdf. Cowdery was named the Director of Public Prosecutions
in New South Wales in 1994.
349. For a general description of the Davis recall, see Howard Fineman & Karen Breslau,
State of Siege, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, at 26-32. Many states, including California, also
have other forms of direct voter control. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
permit voters to propose and enact voter “initiative” statutes without legislative approval.
Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 113-14 (1995). Comprehensive studies of voter behavior
suggest that voters rely heavily on mass media advertising for information on propositions.
Id. at 131-38. For accounts of recent voter initiatives, see James E. Castello, The Limits of
Popular Sovereignity: Using the Initiative Power To Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL.
L. REV. 491 (1986) (discussing California’s Proposition 24, which significantly altered the
state legislature’s internal procedures); Kenneth Janda, Do Our People’s Republics Work?,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 2003, at A27 (noting that twenty-four states have some form of voter
referendum or initiative, and eighteen states allow popular recall of elected officials); Roberto
Suro, California’s SOS on Immigration; Initiative Would Cut Off Illegals’ Benefits, Schooling,
WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1994, at A1 (outlining the battle for California’s controversial anti-
immigrant Proposition 187). Direct democracy is concentrated in western states. Fourteen
states east of the Mississippi, including New York, have no referenda, initiative, or recall
available to their voters, whereas only three west of the Mississippi—Iowa, Minnesota, and
differences noted here. Public opinion on sentencing translates
more readily into law in the United States than in other western
democracies.347 A comparative study of legislatures in the United
States, Britain, and Germany concluded that the U.S. system
produces extreme electoral vulnerability,348 creating especially
strong incentives for symbolic politics—such as “get tough on crime”
initiatives—that play on voters’ anxieties. The California voter
initiative to recall Governor Gray Davis just a few months after his
reelection is a powerful example of the instability created by the
American political system’s populist features.349 Politicians in at
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Texas—lack at least one of these measures. Janda, supra.
350. Savelsberg, supra note 63, at 931.
351. Id. at 929 (discussing the role of neocorporate organizations, such as unions,
employers’ associations, churches, and political parties, in parliamentary testimony and in
controlling the governing boards of major portions of the German news media).
352. See id. at 929.
353. The abolition of the death penalty in various European countries is a good example
of this buffering. The legislatures acted despite strong public support for capital punishment.
At the time of abolition, approximately 60% of the French public and 80% of the British
public supported the death penalty. See Beale, supra note 340, at 430-31.
354. Gary LaFree, Too Much Democracy or Too Much Crime? Lessons from California’s
Three-Strikes Law, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 875, 888 (2002).
355. Savelsberg, supra note 63, at 938-39.
least some European nations are more closely tied to their parties,
and much less at the mercy of the electorate. In contrast to the
United States, where elected officials are increasingly independent
from their political party and directly accountable to their constitu-
encies, politicians in Germany appear to be less affected by public
opinion, from which they are at least partially shielded by the
bureaucratized social organization.350 The heavy involvement of
large neocorporate welfare organizations, such as unions, in the
development and implementation of public policy and in the
regulation of major portions of the news media,351 appear to be
associated with greater stability in German public opinion as
compared with the United States.352 Although not all European
democracies share these features of German society and govern-
ment, many do have greater party discipline, more bureaucratized
societies, and other social and political factors that buffer politi-
cians from the public.353 The European democracies also have less
“social inequality, racial conflict, and poverty.”354 The differences
between the societies may make the deterrence models that
emphasize punishment as a response to crime more attractive in
the United States than in European states more similar to Ger-
many.355
3. The News Media Interact with Culture and Politics
These political and cultural explanations are by no means
inconsistent with the argument presented here that the media’s
crime coverage increases public receptivity to and support for
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356. For a discussion of the political use of crime and the media coverage of crime in the
context of the French presidential election, see supra note 348.
357. See supra Part IV.B.1.
358. Susan Bandes makes a similar point:
Law and media exist in a complex feedback loop. Television, with some help
from other media, has become our culture’s principal storyteller, educator, and
shaper of the popular imagination. It not only transmits legal norms, but also
has a role in creating them. We are constantly constructing and interpreting
our notions of law and justice based on what we know, or what we think we
know.
Bandes, supra note 127, at 585.
punitive crime initiatives. The news media unquestionably play a
vital role in communicating political initiatives and covering
political campaigns. But more important for the purposes of this
Article, news coverage of criminal activity can prepare the way for
coverage of crime initiatives. Political candidates use the news
media to garner support, which in the United States has often
meant campaigning on issues of crime and punishment.356 As noted
above, media coverage of crime helps to set the political agenda and
prime the public to judge candidates by their actions and stands on
criminal justice issues.357 Similarly, culture likely shapes the news
media—which inevitably reflect cultural assumptions—and is in
turn shaped by it. The media both create and transmit norms.358
CONCLUSION
Fundamental economic forces have reshaped the news media in
the United States, and market forces are determining to a substan-
tial degree the extent and content of the news media’s treatment of
crime and the criminal justice system. Evidence that these changes
are not neutral is accumulating. My focus has been on the media’s
treatment of crime from 1990 onward. During that period, crime
fell, but the news media’s focus on crime, especially violent crime,
increased. Remarkably, at least half of the public remained
ignorant of the reduction in crime, and a large majority continued
to rate crime as one of the nation’s most serious problems and to
support even harsher measures. During the same period, a wide
range of punitive laws and policies were promulgated, and recently
adopted laws were implemented with a vengeance, leading to
unprecedented rates of incarceration. Although the research
2006] THE NEWS MEDIA’S INFLUENCE 477
359. Jerry Kang has suggested, however, that the FCC could impose a 15% cap on crime
stories on the local news or require “de-biasing public service announcements” as a means
of decreasing implicit bias against minorities. Kang, supra note 292, at 1573, 1580.
360. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
361. Organizations like the American Press Institute, Criminal Justice Journalists, the
Project for Excellence in Journalism, and the Poynter Institute are promoting efforts to
report stories in meaningful context and to cover stories in proportion to their social and
community significance. See API Home Page, http://www.americanpressinstitute.org (last
visited Oct. 7, 2006); Criminal Justice Journalists Home Page, http://www.reporters.net/cjj
(last visited Oct. 7, 2006); http://www.journalism.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2006); Poynter
Online Home Page, http://www.poynter.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). 
Building Blocks for Youth, an independent policy institute focusing on youth offenders,
recommends expanding sources, providing context, increasing investigative journalism,
balancing crime stories with positive stories about youths, conducting periodic and
transparent audits of news content, and utilizing restraint in the story selection process.
DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 276, at 27-35.
discussed above is not definitive, it supports the view that the news
has been playing an important role in increasing both the political
salience of crime and public support for punitive policies, and doing
so in a manner that activates racist attitudes. According to this
analysis, the news media are playing a critical—though unplanned
and largely unexamined—role in the formulation of criminal justice
policy. Though it does not address the origins of the swing toward
punitiveness in the 1970s, the present research does suggest that
the news media’s treatment of crime has amplified or bolstered
other forces, and has retarded responses that might have mitigated
these policies.
Although news coverage may improve with awareness of the
trends described, the changes are likely to be minimal absent a
shift in market pressures. In light of the First Amendment and the
values it reflects, it is unlikely that Congress or the FCC would seek
to regulate the content of news media, or that such regulation
would be valid if adopted.359 Some media self-monitoring, however,
may occur. For example, the news media’s awareness of the
significant differences in treatment of black and white victims360
might spur greater efforts at evenhandedness. In addition, various
groups of journalists, as well as policy centers and institutes, have
attempted to articulate standards and provide background materi-
als that encourage journalists to write thematic stories or add
thematic elements to stories whose main focus is episodic.361
Journalists might also find preparing thematic stories about crime,
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362. Cf. HAMILTON, supra note 99, at 9-18 (describing the economic theory of information
demand by television viewers).
363. For example, in the mid-1990s, KVUE, a television station in Austin, Texas, limited
its coverage of crime stories by instituting a five-prong test that asked: “1) Does action need
to be taken? 2) Is there an immediate threat to safety? 3) Is there a threat to children? 4)
Does the crime have significant community impact? 5) Does the story lend itself to a crime-
prevention effort?” Joe Holley, Should the Coverage Fit the Crime? A Texas TV Station Tries
To Resist the Allure of Mayhem, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 1996, at 28, available
at http://archives.cjr.org/year/96/3/coverage.asp. Stories were pulled if they could not pass the
test. See id. Apparently this policy is no longer a priority at KVUE, although it may never
have been repudiated. In 2002, the news director of KVUE indicated that the station had
relaxed the rules to some degree: “‘We had gone too far,’ he said. ‘Under those rules, we
wouldn’t have said anything about the O.J. Simpson case or JonBenet Ramsey. We don’t
show gruesome video. But we do cover the sniper case.... It’s something local people are
talking about.’” Bud Kennedy, Local Media Miss the Real Stories, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Oct. 24, 2002. The station’s current website makes no reference to the policy, and
local reporters now refer to the policy in the past tense. See Sharyn Wizda Vane, The Scoop
on Media in America: Veteran Editors Criticize the Way News Is Reported, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Mar. 7, 2002, at E1 (referring to KVUE’s “experiment in the 1990s”).
364. In fact, had KVUE not been the ratings leader in the Austin market, it may not have
been so willing to eschew sensationalistic crime reporting. See Holley, supra note 363.
365. See, e.g., ROBIN CAMPBELL, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUST., DOLLARS AND SENTENCES:
LEGISLATORS’ VIEWS ON PRISONS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE BUDGET CRISIS 3-4 (2003), available
at http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/204_398.pdf; Beale, supra note 340, at 435-37; Vincent
Schiraldi, Digging Out: As U.S. States Begin To Reduce Prison Use, Can America Turn the
Corner on Its Imprisonment Binge?, 24 PACE L. REV. 563, 566 (2004); Seth Stern, Lean Times
Spur Hard Look at Prison Population Boom, CQ WEEKLY, Sept. 11, 2006, at 2365.
366. Beale, supra note 340, at 436.
and a variety of hard news stories, easier and less expensive if
government or private institutions made more of an effort to
provide information.362 Finally, some media outlets may even try,
from time to time, to decrease their focus on crime.363 But given
market forces, these changes are likely to be on the margins as long
as graphic, episodic, tabloid-style crime stories increase viewers or
readers and thus revenues.364
If the media does not change, are there any countervailing forces,
or any mechanisms that might counter this one-way rachet? The
most significant force is already operating. At the state level,
significant budgetary pressures—indeed, crises in many states—
have forced a reexamination of sentencing policies in order to cut
costs.365 Even states, such as Louisiana, that have traditionally
been among the most punitive are now adopting changes to reduce
their prison population in order to make the state budget balance.366
At the state and local level the astronomical costs of our high rates
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367. For example, in 2003 prison expenditures accounted for one-fourteenth of California’s
state budget. See id.
368. The federal prison system in 2002 accounted for only $4.617 billion of the $2.011
trillion federal budget. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 195, 311 (2003),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf/budget.pdf. 
369. See id. at 311.
370. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (“PROTECT Act”) was intended in part to preclude federal judges from
departing downward from the Sentencing Guidelines, imposing what Congress viewed as
unduly lenient sentences. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 5K2.22, 117 Stat. 650, 669-76 (2003). In
contrast to the situation in many states, where funding has leveled off or been reduced,
Congress has continued to provide money to build new prisons and the federal prison
population is continuing to expand significantly. In 2003 the federal prison population was
predicted to continue to expand by 9000 inmates per year; three new federal prisons opened
in 2003, and nine in 2004. See Crime and Justice News, 216,000 Federal Inmates Projected
by 2010, http://cjj.mn-8.net/login.asp?link= (follow “Enter as a Guest” hyperlink; then follow
“Our News Archive” hyperlink; then select “CJN Stories—Search Entire Archive”; then
search for the article’s title) (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). 
371. See Stern, supra note 365.
of imprisonment are imposing financial costs that can no longer be
ignored. Correctional costs now make up a very significant percent-
age of the states’ budgets.367 Many states are constitutionally
required to balance their budgets, and some, like California, face
severely limited sources of revenue. At the state and local level,
thus, a natural corrective is built into the system. On the other
hand, these correctives are largely absent in the federal system,
where correctional costs are less than a drop in the federal budget
bucket,368 and budget deficits are commonplace.369 For that reason
it is not surprising that in 2003 Congress overwhelmingly passed
legislation to increase federal sentences.370 Between 2000 and 2005,
the number of federal inmates grew four times faster than the
number of state inmates.371
Current events, the media themselves, public opinion, and crime
are all dynamic, and changes in each are likely to affect the trends
described in this Article. In the past five years a series of important
events have altered the media’s focus and diverted the public, at
least to some degree, from concern with garden variety domestic
crime. These events included the terrorist attacks of September 11,
the dissemination of Anthrax letters and looming threat of other
terrorist attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the collapse of
corporate giants such as Enron, and the dramatic fall in the stock
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372. Public opinion polls reveal a variety of changes in public opinion, rather than a single
trend. Some pollsters suggest that punitiveness has run its course and the public is
increasingly supportive with alternative sanctions. See, e.g., PETER D. HART RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES, INC., THE OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (Feb. 2002) (finding support for long prison terms “waning” in
favor of a “balanced, multifaceted solution that focuses on prevention and rehabilitation in
concert with other remedies”). On the other hand, a poll in early 2006 found that within the
last year a variety of demographic groups, including women, college graduates, and 18- to 29-
year-olds, ranked reducing crime as an important national priority. PEW RESEARCH CENTER
FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, EMERGING PRIORITIES FOR ’06–ENERGY, CRIME, AND
ENVIRONMENT: ECONOMY NOW SEEN THROUGH PARTISAN PRISM 9 (Jan. 24, 2006), available
at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/268.pdf (finding that in January 2006, 69% of women
and 68% of 18- to 29-year-olds identified reducing crime as something that should be a top
priority for Congress).
373. Both broadcast news and cable outlets lost viewers in the summer of 2003, perhaps
due to “[n]ews [b]urnout” caused by increased coverage of terrorism and the War in Iraq. Jim
Rutenberg, Suffering News Burnout? Rest of America Is, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at
C1.
market and other economic indicators. These events occurred at a
time when public opinion polls had revealed a softening of some of
the punitive attitudes that increased or held steady during most of
the 1990s. One cannot yet say how support for punitive measures
will be affected by these events, except that the public favors
harsher treatment of financial crimes.372
Profound changes are also underway within news media. The
traditional news sources—newspapers, newsmagazines, local and
network television, and radio—have all continued to lose readers or
viewers, while the Internet has become an increasingly important
source of news and twenty-four hour cable news networks have
proliferated.373 Will less exposure to the news mean less fear and
less punitiveness? Or will media outlets try to lure back viewers
with even more crime and violence? Further research is necessary
to explore the implications of these changes, particularly in light of
research indicating that various demographic groups tend to have
different media preferences. 
Finally, one of the most important trends noted in this Article
may have run its course. Data from both victimization surveys and
reported crime suggest that crime rates are stabilizing, rather than
falling, with small increases in some categories of crime for the first
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374. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in September 2005 that the “[v]ictimization
rates for every major type of crime measured were unchanged from their 2003 levels,” and
“[t]aken together, the 1-year (2003-2004) and 2-year (2001-2002 to 2003-2004) change
estimates indicate that crime rates remain stabilized at the lowest levels experienced since
1973.” See CATALANO, supra note 32, at 1. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, however,
indicate a slight increase in murder and nonnegligent manslaughter in 2003. See CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 34, at tbl.1.
time in a decade.374 It remains to be seen how these changes will
impact the story of media influence presented in this Article.
